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The Southern African countries colonial struggles and South African apartheid 
destabilization policies in the mid 1960s to 1980s compelled Southern African states to 
establish a Security Organ. This was to assist them to formulate the common defence 
policy. 
This Organ became known as the Front Line States (FLS). However, a<; mort countries 
attained independence and joined FLS, the grouping established the Southern African Co-
ordination Conference (SADCC) that was later renamed the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). It was SADC, which decided to establish another 
ann, which deals with Politics Defence and Security known as the Organ on Politics 
Defence and Security. The OPDS has experienced major problems in achieving its goals 
since its inception in June 1996. Member states had become suspicious of this body and 
as a result some members decided to operate outside the confines of this body. The main 
aim of this dissertation has been to trace the circumstances and the origin of this Security 
Organ and to evaluate its achievements. However, in august 200 J, OPOS was renamed 
Organ of Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC). This Organ became 
accountable to the Summit not to the chair country, as was the case before. 
The protocol of this Organ is analysed in order to evaluate the roles of this Organ III 
relations to SADe member states. The dissertation also indicated the success and 
limitations of this Organ; the political trends of the region are also discussed. Finally, the 
dissertation deals with the unfinished question, which focuses on the future prospects and 











T ABLE OF CONTENTS 
DECLARATION ............... " ...................... , ............................................................... f> •••••••• III 
ACKNOWLEDGEl\IENTS ........................................................................................... [V 
ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................... V 
T ABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................... VI 
GLOSSARy ..................................................................................................................... IX 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 
CHAPTER ONE: THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF SADC ORGAN ON 
POLITICS, DEFENCE AND SECURITY ..................................................................... 3 
1.0 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 3 
1.1 THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WHIGI LED TO THE FORMATION OF SADC ORGA:--.I ........ ". 4 
1.2 THE FORMATIOf\: OF FRONT U:--.IE STATE (FLS) ....................................................... 4 
1.3 SOUTHERN AFRICA:--.I DEVELOPMEf\:T CO-ORDINATION CONFERENCE (SADCC) ..... 7 
1.4 SOUH1ERN AFRICA:--.I DEVELOPME:--.IT COMMUNITY (SADC) ................................... 8 
1.5 ORGAf\: ON POLITICS, DEFENCE AND SECURITY (OPDS) ...................................... 11 
1.6 NON-MILITARY SECURITY THREATS .................................................................... 13 
CHAPTER T\VO: THE GOALS OF THE SADC ORGAN ON POLITICS, 
DEFENCE AND SECURll'Y ........................................................................................ 16 
2.0 INTRODUC1 ION ...................................................................................................... ) 6 
2.1 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ORGAN 0:--.1 POLITICS. DEFENCE Af\:D SECURITy ...... 16 
2.2 OPDS ACHIEVEMENTS ......................................................................................... 26 
2.3 THE DRC AND LESOTHO INTERVENTIONS ............................................................. 29 
2.3.1 Zimbabwe. Angola and Namibian intervention in the DRC ......................... 29 
2.3.2 South A.ji·ica and Bot.HV(.ln(.l 's intervention in Lesotho ................................... 32 
CHAPTER THREE: \VHY THE ORGAN HAS FAILED ......................................... 36 











3.1 LACK OF CONSENSUS AND POLITICAL WILL.. ..................................................... 36 
3.2 THE LACK OF UNIFIED STRATEGY OF ENDING CO\iFLlCTS .................................... 37 
3.3 UNILATERAL INTERVENTIONS ............................................................................. 38 
3.4 INSTITUTIONAL CONFUSION ..................................................................................... 41 
3.4.1 The Emergence (?[ the Impasse ......................................................................... 42 
3.4.2 Consequences o[the Impasse ..................................................................... ... 44 
3.4.3 The Resolution (if the Impasse ..................................................................... 45 
3.5 DIFFERENT LEVELS OF DEVELOPMENT ................................................................ 47 
CHAPTER FOUR: THE ORGAN AND REGIONAL POLITICAL TRENDS ....... 51 
4.0 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 51 
4.1 THE VALUES THE OPDS WAS DESIGNED TO PROTECT .............................................. 51 
4.2 LACK OF DEMOCRACY IN ZIMBABWE, SWAZILAND AND THE ORe. ........................ 53 
4.2.1 Zimbab}ve .................................................................. ....................................... 53 
4.2.2 S\vaziland ......................................................................................................... 59 
4.2.3 Democratic Republic o[Congo ............................................ ........................... 64 
CHAPTER FIVE: THE EVALUATION OF THE ORGAN ...................................... 67 
5.0 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 67 
5.1 SADC ORGAN ON POLITICS, DEFENCE AND SECURITy ......................................... 67 
5.2 HIGH LEVELS OF MISTRLiST ................................................................................... 67 
5.3 IN fERVENTIONS .................................................................................................... 70 
5.4 LACK OF COMMON DEFENCE POLICy .................................................................... 71 
5.5 LACK OF DEMOCRACY WITHIN THE REGION ......................................................... 72 
CHAPTER SIX: FUTURE PROSPECTS .................................................................... 74 
6.0 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 74 
6.1 THE CHALLENGES OF OPDS .................................................................................. 74 
6.2 PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE .......................................................................................... 78 
6.2.1 Policies on Early Warning ,'))stems .vithin Member Slates ........................... 79 
6.2.2 The RoLe o[Civil Society .................................................................................. 84 
















































Botswana Defence Force 
Economic Community of West African States 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
European Union 
Front Line States 
Humanitarian Early Warning System 
International Press Institute 
Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee 
Inter-State Defence and Security Committee 
Joint Military Commission 
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
Non-Governmental Organisations 
Organisation of African Unity 
Organ on Politics, Defence and Security 
Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation. 
Republic of South Africa 
Southern African Democracy Barometer 
Southern African Development Community 
Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference 
South African National Defence Force 
Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation 
United Nations 












By the mid 1960s several Southern African countries were confronted with major 
security problems. These countries were engaged in a struggle to dislodge colonial forces 
from the region. They had to align themselves with the policies of the Organization of 
African Union (OAU). However towards the end of the 1960s and up to the 1 980s, the 
character of their struggle changed. They were now facing another struggle as a result of 
apartheid in South African. The question was how to deal with a militarily powerful 
South Africa, the hegemon in the region. What exacerbated their problems was the fact 
that they were all economically dependent on South African robust economy for the 
employment of a high proportion of their labour. 
South Africa, on the other hand, was determined to use its leverage to protect its interests. 
It intensified its policies of destabilization, which was later known as "total strategy". 
South Africa threatened these countries with the use of force and sanctions. As a response 
to these threats, some Southern African countries namely, Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia 
and Zaire conceived a collective strategy in 1974 that was intended to alleviate this 
insecurity. They decided to form the first regional body which functions as both Security 
Organ and an economic Organ known as the Front Line States (FLS). These grouping 
were later joined by other regional members and went on to form the Southern Africa 
Coordination Conference and then Southern Africa development Community which gave 
birth to the Organ of Politics Defence and Security in 1996. FLS run concurrently with 
both SADCC and SADC. 
The major purpose of this dissertation is to evaluate the performance of this Organ since 
its inception. The circumstances that led to the establishment of this Organ will also be 
evaluated. The dissertation will argue that while the establishment of the Organ was 
motivated by noble intentions it could not achieve much because realism is the dominant 
regional paradigm on issues of Security and Common Defence policies. The dissertation 
will furthermore argue that the prevailing mistrust between these countries had been 











In undertaking this study qualitative method will be used. This will include a combination 
of policy documents and policy analysis relating to relevant protocols, which were 
instrumental in establishing the Organ on Politics Defence and Security. A literature 
review will be undertaken and other documentary sources related to Southern African 
development Community would also be explored. 
Chapter Outline 
The structure of the study presents a variable-based analysis, which focuses on Southern 
African Development Community countries and the role of the Organ on Politics, 
Defence and Security. The first chapter examines the origin of the first Security Organ in 
the region and its evolution. It also analyses the circumstances, which led to the 
establishment of this Organ. 
In the second chapter we examine what the Organ on Politics Defence and Security was 
established to achieve and to what extent it has achieved its objectives. We also evaluate 
the first two military interventions in the region and explore the role of the Organ in these 
conflicts. 
Chapter Three analyses several factors such as the institutional confusion, different levels 
of development and lack of collective conflict management and resolution strategy and 
argue that these were some of the factors, which led to the Organ failure. 
Chapter Four discusses the values the Organ was designed to protect, examine problem 
cases and analyses the Organ responses these problems. Chapter Five is an evaluation of 
the Organ in relations to its principles, objectives and its entire performance. This chapter 
argues that the goals of the Organ were too ambitious and could not be achieved under 
the current high lever of mistrust between member states. The chapter goes further to 
analyse why the Organ could not perform effectively and efficiently as it was expected. 
In the final chapter, we focus on the unfinished question. What should be done for the 
Organ to be successful and what role should SADC as a whole assume in conflict 
management and resolution? The chapter put forward structures that could ameliorate the 
prevailing situation and thus assist both the Organ and the Summit to carryout their 











Chapter One: The Origin and Evolution of SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and 
Security 
1.0 Introduction 
The evolution an origin of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) can be traced back to the period of 
Southern African countries colonial struggles and the apartheid regime policies of 
destabilisation in the region. These major events in the region were instrumental in 
uniting several of the Southern African countries. They became aware that they were 
confronted by the same enemy-South Africa; hence logic dictated that they cooperate to 
defend themselves. 
It was at this juncture that these countries, Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia and Zaire 
conceived the idea of forming a security grouping to confront these forces. They engaged 
in concerted efforts to establish the first Military Organ that was going to serve as a 
catalyst to these security threats. Suffice it to say that these efforts culminated in the 
establishment of Southern African Development Community itself. It was after the 
establishment of this regional body that OPDS came into being. 
However, the demise of apartheid as the major security threat in the region, following 
democratically elected government in South Africa, may have been expected to usher 
peace in the region as it was assumed in some quarters. This belief may have been 
strengthened by the expansion of regional developments and security mechanism, thereby 
facilitating former adversaries to work together. In many respects however, the instability 
in the region continued. The armed conflict and other security threats did not end, as it 
was perceived. The conflicts in Angola continued and so was the instability in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and political instability in Lesotho. 
Furthermore, security in the region was redefined to include not only the military but 
non-military threats to security as well. In fact external threats to the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of states has been replaced by threats such as unemployment, poverty, 
HIV I Aids, economic decline, human rights abuses, and good governance. The 











1.1 The Circumstances Which Led to the Formation of SADe Organ 
The impetus for the creation of SADC, by Southern African countries, which in tum gave 
birth to SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, lay in several different 
circumstances prominent from 1969. Firstly, Southern African countries were involved in 
collective armed struggles against colonial rule and white minority government in South 
Africa. These struggles led to the development of a collective identity, forged in the heat 
of conflict. These countries were involved in the struggle for independence whereby they 
sought to achieve self-determination. Secondly, from the middle 1960s, their struggles 
intensified. This led to the development of deeply rooted bonds between member states as 
a result of their similar violent political history in the region. Because of these 
experiences, they shared analogous moral and ideological affinities. Thirdly, their 
identities were strengthened further by the ferocity of the onslaught mounted by the 
South African regime in the middle 70s until the late 80s. Finally, all these countries were 
economically dependent on the robust South African economy for the employment of the 
masses of their population, as well as trade, communication, and migrant labour that was 
centred on the industries the economy of South Africa. These were the circumstances, 
which motivated the establishment of a Security Organ of their own. Such an Organ 
would guard against threats, especially those engineered by South Africa. 
1.2 The Formation of Front Line State (FLS) 
The formation of the first Military Organ within this regIOn dates back to the 
consultations between these countries that started in 1969. During this period, several 
countries of Southern Africa held their first meeting in Lusaka, Zambia. This meeting 
adopted the Lusaka Manifesto, which was intended to assist the regional liberation 
struggles in tandem with the Organisation of African Union (OAU). This proclamation 
also established a regional grouping, the Frontline States (FLS).! Pits02 argued that these 
efforts culminated in the establishment of the above interstate sec uri ty co-operation in 
I Christopher Landsberg and Mwesiga Baregu, From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security 
Challenges; A project of the International Peace Academy. ed. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers 2003). 
1. 
2 Major General G.L. Pitso "Southern African Regional Security" in 












1974, when Botswana, Zaire, Tanzania and Zambia formed the Front Line States to co-
ordinate their efforts for the liberation of South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. As more 
Southern African countries received independence, they joined FLS in its concerted 
efforts to resist colonial rule and white minority rule in South Africa. While FLS was 
formed formerly in 1975 to advance the liberation struggle among countries in Southern 
Africa, it also "created a security substructure called the inter-state Defence and Security 
Committee (ISDSC), which met regularly, yet informally, at both Ministerial and Official 
Levels.,,3 It also functioned on an informal basis with the longest serving statesman 
serving as a chairman. 
The formation of FLS as the first Security Organ in Southern Africa stem from the fact 
that "for almost half a century the South African apartheid state was the main source of 
insecurity and instability in Southern Africa, and on the continent".4 
FLS was a Security Organ formed to exclude the apartheid regime and promote further 
cooperation with member states in the political and economic spheres. In the 1970s and 
throughout the following decade, South Africa used threats of force and economic 
sanctions as its major policy instruments in the region. FLS was therefore geared towards 
protecting the region against these policies. It was these events that led to the above 
countries spearheading the formation of FLS. In 1975 the collapse of the Portuguese 
regime in Mozambique altered the regional balance and Zaire left the FLS. Similarly 
South Africa intensified its efforts to ensure that other Southern African countries did not 
escape its dominance. 
The then Prime Minister of South Africa, Johannes Voster, proposed the establishment of 
a constellation of Southern African States in 1975. This was an aggression-based model, 
which encompassed both military and economic measures. His successor P. W. Botha 
expanded this model in 1977. This became a major security problem in the whole sub-
region. He proposed a policy of "total strategy".5 Most independent countries in the 
3 Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk, "Regionalism into Globalism? War into Peace? SADC and Ecowas compared" 
in African Security Review, Vol. 10 N02 (2001), II. 
4Tandeka C. Nkiwane, "The Quest for Good Governance' in Christopher Landsberg and Mwesiga Baregu, 
From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges; A project of the International Peace 
Academy, ed. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers 2003), 58. 
5 Christopher Landsberg and Mwesiga Baregu, From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security 











region were receiving military support from the Eastern Block. Pretoria perceived this 
action by the Communist countries as a major threat to its national security and interests. 
Therefore, it defined these threats as "total onslaught" and it responded swiftly with a 
policy of "total strategy," designed to protect its national interests, which it argued were 
threatened by communists.6 This threat brought about different security conceptions in 
the region. For instance, "security was then seen in zero-sum terms: the security of one 
meant the insecurity of the other, a view that deepened even further as the conflict gained 
a regional character".7 Political instability within the Region was therefore associated 
with apartheid destabilising policies. Therefore, 
the concept of total strategy was based on South Africa's claim of a right to 
intervene in any African state south of the equator, and South Africa's perception 
that it was surrounded by a "total onslaught" of liberation forces. s 
It was during this period that the region witnessed South Africa's flagrant violation of 
and refusal to adhere to accepted norms of international law. The regime engaged in 
series of military incursions and destabilisation in neighbouring countries such as 
Mozambique, Lesotho, Angola, Zimbabwe and Botswana.9 In order to carry out these 
incursions, between 1975 and 1985, South African defence expenditure rose dramatically 
from 692 million to 4.27 billion rands. 10 
From 1977, active consultations were undertaken by representatives of the Frontline 
States, culminating in a meeting of Foreign Ministries of the Frontline States in 
Gaborone, in May 1979. Another meeting of Ministers responsible for economic 
development was subsequently convened in Arusha, Tanzania, in July 1979. The above 
meetings focused on security issues facing the region. The Arusha meeting led to the 
birth of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) a year 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid, 34. 
8 Tandeka C. Nkiwane, "The Quest for Good Governance' in Christopher Landsberg and Mwesiga Baregu, 
From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges; A project of the International Peace 
Academy, ed. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers 2003), 59-60. 
9 Ibid, 60. 











later. II The founding members were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. These countries were later joined by 
Namibia after attaining her independence in 1990. 
1.3 Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) 
The formation of this body was a direct response to the South African proposal to 
establish a constellation of Southern African states. The SADCC was formed with four 
principal objectives, namely: 
a) to reduce Member States dependence, particularly, but not only, on apartheid 
South Africa 
b) to implement programmes and projects with national and regional impact; 
c) to mobilise Member States' resources in the quest tor collective self-reliance; and 
d) to secure international understanding and support. 12 
Through SADCC, the founding fathers sought first to demonstrate the tangible benetits of 
working together, and to cultivate a climate of confidence and trust among member 
States. SADCC was finally constituted in April 1980. The founding fathers made a 
declaration in Lusaka, Zambia about the regional economic liberalisation, which 
conforms to the above objectives. However, the 
key objectives of the SADCC were to harmonize developments among the 
countries of Southern Africa (excluding South Africa and South West 
AfricalNamibia) and to reduce economic dependence on South Africa, while 
simultaneously supporting the liberation struggles through FLS. 13 
During this period, the geostrategic focus of all Southern African states on military 
security and destabilisation was diametrically opposed to the "total strategy" of the South 
African regime. 
II History, Evolution and Current Status, 
http://www .sade. intlindex.php? &Iang=engl i sh&path=about/baekground&page=history (accessed 8-8-
2003) 
Ie Ibid. 
13 Tandeka C. Nkiwane, 'The Quest for Good Governance' in Christopher Landsberg and Mwesiga 
Baregu. From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges; A project of the 











These countries foreign policies advocated military confrontation with South Africa (SA) 
from the 1970s up to 1990. The FLS argued that the defeat of apartheid would bring 
about the removal of the security threat posed by SA and a new level of cooperation and 
economic development. However, some members proposed the creation of a new 
political organisation to run parallel to the FLS. This new organisation was to be known 
as Southern African Development Community (SADC). The 1992 treaty subsequently 
embraced this position. 
1.4 Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
In 1990 after four years of consultations, Southern African states decided to formalise 
SADCC by giving it an appropriate legal status in the Summit of Heads of States and 
Governments in Harare, Zimbabwe. It was at this stage that democratisation in SA was 
imminent and 
the Summit articulated its confidence that those events (in SA leading towards 
democratisation) would... take the region out of an era of conflict and 
confrontation, to one of co-operation; in a climate of peace, security and 
stability. 14 
In January 1992, the Windhoek Treaty, which changed SADCC to Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) was signed in Windhoek Namibia. is 
The origin of SADC therefore, lies in the SADCC. According to Van Nieuwkerk, SADC 
was formed "as part of the strategy of FLS to counter apartheid destabilisation in the 
Southern African region.,,16 Therefore, SADCC motivation was to reduce its member's 
economic dependence on the racist South African regime and co-ordinate foreign aid and 
investment in the region. 
14 Major General G.L. Pitso "Southern African Regional Security" in 
http://www.mil.zalCSANDF/CJSupp/TrainingForrnationiDefenceCollege/Researchpapers ... 3. 
(2003/08/06). 
15 Christopher Landsberg and Mwesiga 8aregu, From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security 
Challenges; A project of the International Peace Academy, ed. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers 2003 
16 Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk, "Regionalism into Globalism? War into Peace? SADC and Ecowas compared" 











The above Treaty, which established the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), committed member States to the following fundamental principles: 
Sovereign equality of Member States 
- Solidarity, peace and security 
Human rights, democracy and rule of law 
- Equity, balance and mutual benefit 17 
The SA DC treaty redefined security threats facing the region. It heralds a new phase in 
regional cooperation and security. This treaty was motivated by positive events in South 
Africa whereby the apartheid regime was ending. Member states committed themselves 
to "a framework and mechanism to strengthen regional solidarity and provide for mutual 
peace and security,,18 in the region. This new security framework addressed non-military 
areas and signalled the expansion of SADC focus on both politics and economic issues. 
In 1994, a democratically elected South Africa joined the SADC. This meant that a long-
standing military threat was removed. 
However, the demise of apartheid replaced military threats with equally severe non-
political and economic threats. Some of these were lack of political will towards 
democratisation exhibited by some member states, migration which triggered tension 
between SADC members, and escalating economic problems such as unemployment, 
weak regional economies and increasing crime rates. It was upon recognition of these 
problems that it was concluded that no single country in the region was capable of 
addressing these problems on its own. Therefore, "they require a transnational approach 
founded on cooperation and co-ordinated strategy that responsive to military, economic, 
political and social challenges". 19 
In order to address these problems, a SADC Parliamentary forum was established. This 
body was to become a channel for the implementation of policies that facilitated regional 
17 History, Evolution and Current Status, 
http://www.sadc.intlindex.php?&1 ang=engl ish&path=aboutlbackground&page=history (acccsscd 8-8-
2003). 
1& Tandeka C. Nkiwane, "The Quest for Good Governance' in Christopher Landsberg and Mwesiga 
Baregu. From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges; A project of the 
International Pcace Academy, cd. (London: Lynnc Rienncr Publishers 2003). 61. 
19 Christopher Landsberg and Mwesiga Baregu, From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolying Security 












integration. Some of these policies involved the forum's "promotion of peace, 
democracy, security, and stability on the basis of collective responsibility and its support 
for the development of permanent conflict resolution mechanisms in the sub· region".20 
This was in accordance with the 1992 SADC treaty objectives. Member states saw the 
opportunity of creating a common security regime, in keeping with the fifth objective of 
SADC, which advocated promotion of peace, common defence, and effective security 
policy in the region, as well as management of conflicts through peaceful means. It was 
envisaged that, in order to achieve mutual security "the region needs therefore to 
establish a framework and mechanism to strengthen regional solidarity and provide for 
mutual peace and securitY".21 
SA DC formal involvement in security co-ordination, conflict resolution and military co-
operation was introduced at the SADC workshop on democracy, peace and security in 
Windhoek from 11 to 16 June 1994. The workshop recommended that contlict resolution 
and political cooperation should become an independent sector, which would be allocated 
to a member state to coordinate. The workshop also recommended that a protocol on 
peace, security and conflict resolution be formulated. On the 30th June 1994 FLS decided 
to dissolve and become the political and security wing of SADC. These initiatives 
culminated in a July 1994 workshop 
which recommended SADC cooperation in political, human rights, and security 
spheres-a recommendation that formed the basis for the decision at the SADC 
Gaborone Summit in August 1994 to establish a formal SADC sector on political 
cooperation, democracy, peace and security?2 
These recommendations were also endorsed by Southern African nongovernmental 
organisations (NGO's), which participated in Windhoek especially the proposal of SA DC 
Human Rights Commission. The August 1994 Summit also agreed to disband the FLS 
20 Ibid, 4. 
21 Mwesiga Baregu 'Economic and Military Security' in Christopher Landsberg and Mwesiga Baregu, 
From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges; A project of the International Peace 
Academy, ed. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers 2003), 36. 
22 Tandeka C. Nkiwane, "The Quest for Good Governance' in Christopher Landsberg and Mwesiga 
Baregu, From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security Cha\1enges; A project of the 











and integrated all its operations into the SADC sector taking with it ISDSC (formerly part 
of FLS). Since most SADC sectors had been allocated to individual member states, 
Zimbabwe was designated to coordinate FLS security operations. 
The region continued to face other security threats, not least among them the mass 
inflow of refugees across borders. These threats made regional cooperation not only 
desirable but also necessary in the spheres of politics and security. The formation of a 
formal sector on Political Cooperation, Democracy, Peace and Security was to develop 
cooperation and commit member states to peaceful resolution of inter and intra-state 
conflicts in the short term, while in the long term the focus was to develop a common 
defence policy. The founding fathers of SADC envisaged it to be firstly an institutional 
approach towards cooperation in functional areas and secondly as an economic and 
political community whereby cooperation would lead to progress in the security sphere. 
Another attempt was made by SADC to enhance this cooperation. The region envisaged 
the establishment of an Association of Southern African states (ASAS) as a successor to 
FLS in Zimbabwe on the 3rd March 1995. It was proposed that this Organ should have 
two committees, one serving political and the other defence matters. Like both its 
predecessors FLS and SADCC its chairmanship were to rotate according to seniority. The 
ASAS proposal was taken to the 1995 SADC Summit in Johannesburg where it was 
postponed indefinitely. The summit further decided that any final decision on security 
architecture would be made in the 1996 Maseru Summit. 
1.5 Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) 
It was as a result of these circumstances that the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security 
was created in Botswana in June 1996. In fact, significant initiatives within SADC were 
made since the 1992 treaty in Windhoek, Namibia. The region recognised and undertook 
collective security arrangements that were put in place in 1996. The Organ on Politics 
Defence and Security was established as the culmination of several discussions that 
began as early as the 1980s. Baregu and Landsberg argued that 
the concept of an OPDS was proposed at a meeting of the SADC Ministers of 











January 1996. The SADC Heads of state and government then adopted and 
approved the concept on the 28 June 1996.23 
The establishment of OPDS was motivated by several additional factors. SADC member 
states became aware that with the end of cold war, they had to develop common security 
policies. Contemporary society and modern technological age have made; 
common problems to transcend national borders, thus states cannot protect their 
citizens through unilateral military means. They share an interest in joint survival 
and should therefore organise their security policies in co-operation with each 
other.24 
These were some of the issues that informed the creation of OPDS within SADC. 
These countries envisaged OPDS as an institutional mechanism that would coordinate 
their activities and policies in the areas of politics, defence, and security. 
what was even more salient about this Organ was the fact that some of its 
principles envisaged the management of conflicts through "negotiations, 
mediation and arbitration; and military intervention will only be condoned after 
all possible alternatives have been pursued in accordance with the charter of the 
OAU and the United Nations?5 
It was clear that the member states were committed to respecting territorial integrity and 
the sovereignty of states. On the other hand, this pledge made it clear that the organ was 
not going to be an autonomous body from SADC. 
Regional security in Southern Africa had motivated considerable debate since the end of 
the cold war. The debate accelerated after the end of apartheid in South Africa. 
23 Ibid, 5. 
24 Heribert Dieter, Guy Lamb and Henning Melber, "Prospects for regional Co-operation in South Africa' 
in Regionalism and Regional Integration: a Debate of Current Aspects and Issues, Discussion Paper II 












What was most salient about this debate were several attempts made to redefine the 
meaning of security, de-emphasising traditional state centric definitions in favour of a 
broader definition. The traditional view of security was seen as too narrow and not 
developmental in nature. This new broader thinking about security derived from the fact 
that security, viewed through the military lens of threat perception, has often led to high 
defence expenditures and confrontation rather than negotiation. It has tended to be state-
centric rather than people-centric.26 
1.6 Non-Military Security Threats 
The new security thinking has become multifaceted and come to include various aspects 
that have a potential to transform themselves into security threats for both intra-and-
interstate conflicts. Issues like bad governance, environmental degradation, poverty and 
disease have been added to the new security thinking. This security paradigm recognises 
military security as part of the development within the SADC region. 
While the new security thinking has made its mark in several areas, including motivating 
the establishment of OPDS, its impact within SA DC appears to be negligible as far as 
member states were concerned. For instance, civil society and academic sectors were 
never involved prior to the establishment of OPDS to participate in this challenging task. 
The exclusion of civil society in this area has been viewed as contrary to the new security 
thinking. This meant that an important input to the Organ policy making machinery had 
been left out. The new security thinking also requires shared values. This stresses the 
observance of human rights, democratic freedoms, and non-violent means of conflict 
resolution, justice and reconciliation. Therefore, SADC must conceptualise new security 
thinking which ascribes an active role to civil society in establishing a people-centred 
approach to security issues. 
Despite the end of the cold war and the demise of apartheid South Africa, the region had 
been consistently experiencing intra and inter-states conflicts, which threatened peace 
and security in the region. For instance, aside from the 25 year war in Angola and 
26 France Kornegay and Simon Chesterman, "Southern Africa's Evolving Security Architecture: Problems 
and Prospects "in Program on Developing Regional and Sub-Regional Security Mechanisms in Africa; 
Conference held by International Peace Academy in Partnership with the African Renaissance Institute the 
Southern African Regional Institute for Policy Studies and the Department of International Relations, 











instability in Zimbabwe and Lesotho, the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) has involved seven states from Southern Africa and the Great Lakes region, 
Angola, Burundi; Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe, as well as Chad?7 
In 1998, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola claimed that they had intervened in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo on behalf of the OPDS to assist the President of that 
country. Similarly, South Africa (SA) and Botswana also justified their intervention in 
Lesotho on the basis of the SADC, barely a month after declining to do so in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. However, the same intervention was not extended to the 
protracted civil war in Angola, which only came to an end after the death of long time 
Guerrilla leader Jonas Savimbi in 2002. 
In all these cases the SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security was largely 
ineffectuaL Furthermore, other factors within a broader security definition, like 
HIV/AIDS, poverty and extreme inequalities presented a major threat to security in 
Southern Africa. In addressing these challenges, SADC had delegated responsibility to 
OPDS as an Organ representing a common security regime in the region. However, this 
common security regime whose functions include the prevention and resolution 
of high intensity conflict-has itself been a source of considerable tension among 
member states and has yet to be constituted.28 
The ten-year delay in establishing a common security vIsion has been attributed to 
animosity between the Republics of South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
However, within OPDS there is another structure, inherited from the now defunct Front 
Line States (FLS), namely, the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC). 
This structure serves as another arm of OPDS in addressing some of the above 
challenges. The 1996 protocol had made conflict resolution through peaceful means its 
top priority. This means that OPDS must find means of addressing conflicts within the 
region by peaceful means and resorting to intervention as a last resort. 
27 Ibid, 1. 
28 Nathan, Laurie (2002) "Organ Failure": A Review of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and 
Security: In Regional Integration for Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in Africa; ed. Laakso Liisa 
(Regional Integration for Conflict Prevention and peace Building in Africa, Europe, SADC and ECOW AS. 











The OPDS was established when member states were going through democratic 
transitions. Countries like Mozambique, Lesotho, Namibia, Malawi, Zambia and 
Tanzania aspired to become democracies. However, in these countries, democracy is 
imperfect unlike in South Africa where there are good signs of democratic consolidation. 
It was also during this period when some member states like Swaziland and the DRC, 
were increasingly unwilling to democratise, while ten other member states have 
democratised. The 2002 Zimbabwe elections created more controversy within the SADC 
region. There were several allegations by outside observers that the outcome was rigged. 
This exacerbated serious discontent and polarisation between the ruling party and the 
major opposition party. The country has since experienced acute lawlessness through 
shattering unrest, isolation from the international community including suspension from 
the Commonwealth, special/smart sanctions, rapid economic decline and the deterioration 
of its currency. 
The origin and evolution of SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security lay in 
initiatives taken by Southern African countries in response to insecurity emanating from 
South Africa, as well as the acknowledgement that in order to overcome their political, 
economic and security problems they must work together. Following some 
misunderstandings that arose within member states about the role of OPDS, this Security 
Organ was renamed the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC). 
This decision was ratified in Malawi, Blantyre Summit in august 2001. OPDS was 












Chapter Two: The Goals of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security 
2.0 Introduction 
The creation of the Organ on Politics Defence and Security was a major milestone within 
the Southern African Development Community. This Organ was to mediate through 
peaceful means both intra-state and inter-states conflicts within the region. In order to 
perform these functions, the SADC Summit formulated a protocol, which paved the way 
for the OPDS to execute this enormous task. As such, appropriate bureaucratic 
institutions were also created which were to assist this Organ to implement its mandate. 
These institutions were also staffed by and responsible to SADC while on the other hand 
they were also responsible to the Organ, as the SADC implementing body. While OPDS 
was frequently successful in carrying out its mandate, in other cases it was not so 
successful. 
For instance, two years after the OPDS was created there were two military interventions 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Kingdom of Lesotho. These 
interventions were followed in 2002 by the disputed elections in Zimbabwe. The region 
was faced with two major problems even before these interventions; the failure of 
Swaziland to democratise while most member states have done so including the newest 
member and regional power the Republic of South Africa (SA), as well as the continuing 
and protracted civil war in Angola. It is the task of this chapter to evaluate the 
performance of OPDS in addressing these challenges. 
2.1 The Establishment of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Securi(v 
On the 28th June 1996, the Heads of States and government of Southern African 
Development Community launched the protocol, which established the 'Organ on 
Politics, Defence and Security' (OPDS)29. According to Cilliers, the newly appointed 
South African Minister of Defence, Mosiuoa Lekota, in applauding the SADC initiatives 
of establishing this Organ, argued that it was a defence pact to protect countries from 
foreign aggression. He stated further that: 
2<) SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, in 











it was no longer appropriate for the region to have an ad hoc response to threats 
to national sovereignty in the region. Without an instrument that provides 
guidelines to protect legitimate governments in the region from foreign-armed 
aggression, peace cannot be guaranteed.3o 
This Organ was born out of several SADC Summits and Council meetings.3l By 
launching the establishment of the OPDS, these leaders made a strong statement to the 
world about their commitment to principle of regionalism and democratisation. In this 
protocol, as will be discussed below, their commitment to peaceful resolution of both 
intra-state and inter-state conflicts was clear. They vowed to settle their internal problems 
through negotiations and consensus. In doing this Heads of states and government 
committed themselves to the promotion of peace through working together, assisting each 
other to create political stability in their countries. They envisaged that all things being 
equal, the Organ would for all intents and purposes address most of their democratic 
transition challenges. They were reaffirming their commitment to regional arrangements 
in terms of how to manage their politics, security and defence problems. The aim of 
member states in designing the structure of the Organ was to make it flexible and 
responsive to regional problems that might arise. Similarly, this security architecture was 
designed in such a way that it operates within the framework and in some cases the 
direction of the Summit. Article 3 of the Organ32 clearly reflects this line of thinking. For 
instance section 1 illustrated that the Organ shall be an institution of SA DC and shall 
report to the Summit. This means that the Organ is accountable to the Summit for its 
entire operations. 
30 Jakkie Cilliers, http:///www.iss.co.zalPUBS?monographs?~043/Contents.html. 14. 
31 The first workshop which recommended establishment of SA DC Organ on politics, Defence and security 
was held at Windhoek from 11 to 16 July 1994. This workshop was known as workshop on Democracy, 
Peace and Security. The workshop set SADC on a course towards involvement in security co-ordination, 
conflict mediation, and even military co-operation at the state level. The recommendation was then passed 
to the Council of Ministers meeting in Botswana. However, the meeting decided to establish a wing for 
conflict mediation and prevention, as opposed to a sector. The breakthrough came on the 3fd March 1995 
when SADC Foreign Ministers recommended the creation of Association of Southern African States 
(ASAS), under Chapter 7, Article 21 (3) (g) of the SADC Treaty. It was envisaged that ASAS would 
incorporate two specialized SADC sectors, one dealing with political affairs and the other with military 
security. 
32 SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, in 











In order to fulfil the above role, the Organ according to section 2 of the same Article, 
shall have its chairperson, the Troika, a Ministerial Committee, an Inter-State Politics and 
Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC), an Inter-State Defence and Security Committee 
(ISDSC) and such other sub-structures as may be established by any of the ministerial 
committees. Section 3 of this Article, argues that the Troika shall consist of the 
Chairperson of the Troika, the incoming Chairperson who shall become Deputy 
Chairperson of the Organ and the outgoing Chairperson.33 This structure offers the 
advantage of guaranteeing continuity, as the troika presiding over SADC remained 
unchanged for three consecutive years. This arrangement proVIdes harmonisation of 
security policies. 
The OPD will be integrated in the SA DC structures but coordinated at the Summit level, 
and will rotate on an annual and troika basis reporting to the chairperson of the Summit. 
These bureaucratic institutions were geared towards making the Organ more effective 
and efficient in carrying out its functions. 
The Protocol goes further in Articles 4 to 9 to describe how the above structure would be 
operationalised. According to Article 4, the Summit has been empowered to elect a 
Chairperson and a Deputy Chairperson of the Organ on the basis of rotation from among 
the members of the Sununit except that the Chairperson and the Deputy Chairperson of 
the Summit shall not simultaneously be the chairperson of the Organ. The term of the 
Chairperson of the Organ according to this Article shall be one year respectively. The 
Chairperson of the Organ shall consult with the Troika of SADC and report to the 
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Africa's evolving Security Challenges. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers 
Therefore the protocol argued that the Chairperson, in consultation with the Troika of 
SADC, should be responsible for the overall policy direction and the achievement of the 
objectives of the Organ. 
The Chairperson may request reports from any Ministerial Committee of the Organ on 
any matter within the competence of the committee. Similarly, the Chairperson may 
request any Ministerial Committee of the Organ to consider any matter, which is within 











Chairperson of SA DC to table for discussion any matter that requires consideration by 
the summit. 34 
In relation to Article 5, which determines the functions of the Ministerial Committee, the 
article argued that this committee shall be composed of the Ministers responsible for 
Foreign Affairs, Defence, Public Security and State Security from each of the member 
states. This committee shall be responsible for the co-ordination of the work of the Organ 
and its structures. In terms of its responsibility, it shall report to the Chairperson of the 
Organ. It shall however be chaired by a Minister from the same country as the 
Chairperson for a period of one year on a rotation basis. The Chairperson of the 
Committee shall convene at least one meeting on an annual basis. However, the 
Chairperson of the committee may when necessary convene other meetings of the 
Ministerial Committee at the request of either ISPDC or ISDSC. This Committee may 
refer any relevant matter to, and may request reports from, ISPDC and ISDSC.35 
Article 6 of the same protocol argued that the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy 
Committee (ISPDC) should be composed of Ministers of Foreign Affairs from each of 
the member countries. This committee shall perform such functions as may be necessary 
to achieve the objectives of the Organ relating to politics and diplomacy. It shall also 
report to the Ministerial Committee without prejudice to its obligation to report regularly 
to the Chairperson. A Minister from the same country as the Chairperson chairs this 
Committee according to this protocol for a period of one year and on a rotation basis. 
Like the above Committees, the Chairperson of ISPDC shall convene at least one meeting 
on an annual basis as he or she deems necessary or as requested by another Minister 
serving on ISPDC. The Committee is however allowed to establish such sub-structures, 
as it deems necessary to perform its functions. 36 
Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) according to Article 7, shall 
comprise the Ministers responsible for Defence, Public Security and State Security from 














It shall perform such functions as may be necessary to achieve the objectives of the 
Organ relating to defence and security, and shall assume the objectIves and functions of 
the existing Inter-state Defence and Security Committee. It shall report to the Ministerial 
Committee without prejudice to its obligation to report regularly to the Chairperson. A 
Minister from the same country as the Chairperson shall chair rSDSC for a period of one 
year and on a rotating basis. The Chairperson is required to convene one meeting 
annually and other such meetings as he or she deems necessary or as requested by 
another minister serving on ISDSC. Nonetheless, ISDSC shall retain the Defence, State 
Security and Public Security Sub-Committees and other subordinate structures of the 
existing Inter-State Defence and Security Committee. It may also establish such other 
structures, as it deems necessary to perform its functions. 37 
As a matter of procedure, Article 8 indicated that in all ministerial committees of the 
Organ, the quorum for all meetings shall be two-thirds of the State Parties. However, 
these committees shall determine their own rules of procedure and decisions shall be 
taken on consensual basis. Finally, Article 9 mandated the SADC Secretariat to provide 
. . h 0 38 secretanat servIces to t e rgan: 
Article 11 of the 1996 protocol, obliges the Organ to operate in terms of international 
law. The Charter of the UN under this Article section one (1) states that parties shall 
refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, other than for the legitimate purpose of individual or 
collective self-defence against an armed attack. State parties shall manage and seek to 
resolve any dispute between two or more of them by peaceful means. The Organ shall 
seek to manage and resolve inter-and intra-state connict by peaceful means. Therefore, 
the Organ shall also seek to ensure that the State Parties adhere to and enforce all 
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In terms of OPDS jurisdiction, Article 11 section two (2) of the protocol, stated that the 
Organ may seek to resolve any significant inter-state conflict between State Parties or 
between a state Party and non-State Party and a 'significant inter-state conflict' shall 
include a conflict over territorial boundaries or natural resources. It may also include a 
conflict in which an act of aggression or other form of military force has occurred or been 
threatened. 
This conflict shall also involve a conflict, which threatens peace and security in the 
region or in the territory of a state party, which is not a party to the conflict. The Organ 
may seek to resolve any significant intra-state conflict within the territory of a State Party 
and a 'significant intra-state conflict' shall include large-scale violence between sections 
of the popUlation or between the state and sections of the population, including genocide, 
ethnic cleansing and gross violation of human rights. Furthermore, a military coup or 
other threat to the legitimate authority of a State, a condition of civil war or resurgency, 
and a conflict which threatens peace and security in the region or in the territory of 
another state Party. Subsection (c) of this section argued that the Organ in executing all 
these functions must do so in consultation with the United Nations Security Council and 
the Central Organ of the African Unity Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management 
and Resolution. The Organ may also offer to mediate in a significant inter-or intra-state 
conflict that occurs outside the region.40 
Like any international organisation, OPDS must adopt certain methods and procedures 
that will assist in the implementation of these obligations. According to section three (3) 
of Article 11, these methods employed by the Organ are envisaged to prevent, manage 
and resolve conflict by peaceful means. They shall include but not be limited to 
preventative diplomacy, negotiations, conciliation, mediation, good offices, arbitration 
and adjudication by an international tribunal. 
This section goes further to state that the Organ shall establish an early warning system in 
order to facilitate timeous action to prevent the outbreak and escalation of conflict. Where 
peaceful means of resolving a conflict are unsuccessful, the Chairperson acting on the 
advice of the Ministerial Committee may recommend to the Summit that enforcement 












enforcement action only as a matter of last resort and in accordance with Article 53 of the 
United Nations Charter, i.e. with the authorization of the Security CounciL Therefore, 
external military threats to the Region shall be addressed through collective security 
arrangements to be agreed upon in a Mutual Defence Pact among the State Parties.41 
The OPDS in its quest to execute its mandate of conflict management and prevention 
must follow procedures, which are contained in Article 11 section four (4). They stated 
that, in respect of both inter-and intra-state conflicts, the Organ shall seek to obtain the 
consent of the disputant parties to its peacemaking efforts. The Chairperson, in 
consultation with the other members of the troika, may table any significant conflict for 
discussion in the Organ. According to this subsection therefore, any State Party may 
request the Chairperson to table any significant conflict for discussion in the Organ and in 
consultation with the other members of the troika; the Chairperson shall meet such 
requests expeditiously. Similarly, the Organ shall respond to a request by a State Party to 
mediate in a conflict within the territory of that state and shall endeavour by diplomatic 
means to obtain such request where it is not forthcoming. Finally, and in accordance with 
Article 11 section 4 (e), the exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence 
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and to the Central Organ of the 
African Unity Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.42 
SADC created a framework, which encapsulated procedural aspects that govern OPDS 
roles and responsibilities in conducting its relations with member states when dealing 
with conflicts. According to Nathan, the Organ in its preamble emphasised strict respect 
for each member state's territorial integrity and sovereignty.43 The preamble also 
advocated respect for good neighbourliness, interdependence, sovereign equality, 
political independence, non-aggression and non-interference in the internal affairs of the 
member states. The 1996 protocol also articulated the objectives of the Organ, which 
provided the framework for its operations. These objectives laid down collective security 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Laurie Nathan, (2002) "Organ Failure": A Review of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and 
Security: In Regional Integration for Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in Africa; ed. Laakso Liisa 
(Regional Integration for Conflict Prevention and peace Building in Africa, Europe, SADC and ECOWAS. 











arrangements. For instance, Baregu44 argued that, the objective of the OPDS protocol as 
provided by Article 2 of the Organ illustrated succinctly collective security arrangements 
because they are geared towards protection of human rights and serve as guiding 
principles for the Organ as they seek to; 
a) Protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against instability 
arising from the breakdown of law and order, intra-state contlict, interstate 
contlict and aggression; 
b) Promote political co-operation among the member states and the evolving 
common political value system and institutions; 
c) Develop a common foreign policy in areas of mutual concern and interest and 
lobbying as a region on issues of common interest in international fora; 
d) Promote regional co-ordination and co-operation on matters related to security 
and defence and establish appropriate mechanism of contlict prevention, 
management, and resolution to this end; 
e) Prevent, contain and resolve inter and intra-state contlict by peaceful means and 
through mediating inter-and intrastate disputes; 
f) Use preventative diplomacy to pre-empt contlict in the region, both within and 
between states, through an early warning systems and consider enforcement 
action in accordance with international law and as a matter of last resort where 
peaceful means have failed; 
g) Promoting and enhancing the development of democratic institution and practices 
within the territories of State Parties and encourage the observance of universal 
human rights as provided for in the charters and conventions of the UN and OAU; 
h) Developing a collective security capacity and concluding a mutual defence pact 
for responding to external military threats, and building up regional peacekeeping 
capacity within national armies that could be called on to act within the region 
and elsewhere; 
44 M. Baregu, "Preventive Diplomacy and Peace-Building in Southern Africa", SARlPS Peace and Security 











i) Develop close co-operation between the police and state security services of the 
States Parties in order to address cross-border crime as well as promoting a 
community based approach to domestic security; 
j) Observe, and encourage the State Parties to implement, United Nations and 
African Union and other international conventions and treaties on arms control, 
disarmament and peaceful relations between states; 
k) Develop the peace-keeping capacity of national defence forces and co-ordinate 
the participation of the State Parties in peace-keeping operations; and 
I) Enhance regional capacity in respect of disaster management and co-ordination of 
international humanitarian assistance and also address conflicts outside the region 
that affect peace and security in Southern Africa. 45 
This protocol committed the member states to abide by UN Security Council resolutions 
in the maintenance of peace and security within the region. They would work in close co-
operation in matters relating to politics, defence and security. They committed 
themselves to adopt conflict resolution mechanism rather than direct intervention in the 
domestic affairs of member states. 
The Summit reaffirmed that the SADC Organ constituted an appropriate institutional 
framework by which SADC countries would coordinate their policies and activities in the 
areas of politics, defence and security. They therefore agreed to the principles, which 
would guide OPDS in its operation in addition to those explained by Nathan above. The 
principles appear as inter-alia, set out in Article 4 of the SADC treaty, which shall be the 
guiding principles for the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security: 
1. Achievement of solidarity, peace and security in the region; 
ii. Observance of human rights, democracy and the rule oflaw; 
iii. Promotion of economic development in the SADC region in order to achieve for 
all member states, equity, balance and mutual benefit; 
45 SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, in 
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IV. Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation. mediation and arbitration; 
v. Military intervention of whatever nature shall be decided upon only after all 
possible political remedies have been exhausted in accordance with the charter of 
the AU and of the United Nations.46 
The organ was therefore set up to achieve the above principles and objectives. However 
as a SADC implementing body the Organ in executing its mandate had to work closely 
with member states. The Organ since its inception appears to have achieved some 
successes in implementing the above mandate. Despite some limitations, which derived 
from the fact that the Organ is still young and growing, some achievements have been 
recorded to date. 
2.2 OPDS Achievements 
The foremost achievements of SA DC have been in all sectors including politics, defence 
and security, demonstrating that regional co-operation is not only desirable but also 
possible . .J7 SADC has also been able to inculcate a sense of regional belonging as well as 
a tradition of consultation among the people and governments of Southern Africa in 
defence policy issues and security within the region.48 The region has been able to put in 
place a regional programme of action the SADC Programme of Action - that covers 
cooperation in various economic and security sectors. These hard-earned achievements 
have provided a firm foundation without which any attempt at building a regional 
security and defence community would have definitely tailed.49 
Secondly, SADC Organ under the chairmanship of Zimbabwe has been able to mount 
operation Blue Hungwe successfully. Blue Hungwe was, at best, a multinational joint 
field training exercise in the tactics and techniques of UN peacekeeping, such as 
patrolling, observation, convoy escort and negotiation. It proved, albeit on a small scale 
"" The SADC Communique on the Summit of Heads of States and Governments ofthc Southern African 
Community (SADC) met in Gaborone, the Republic of Botswana, on 28'h June 1996, under the 
Chairmanship of His Excellency, Sir Ketumile Masire, president of the Republic of Botswana, to launch 
the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. 
Coning Cedric de, "A new Lcase of Life for the SADC Organ", in Conflict Trends-No.411999, Southern 
African Developmcnt Community 
http://www.accord.org.zalweb.nsflO!89cf608dc3288fc542256a 14002 f81 O'!Open Document (accessed 













and under simulated conditions, these elements of the various armed forces of the region 
have the capability to train and operate together.50 Despite far greater South African 
resources, Zimbabwe has been accepted at the level of the ISDSC as the 'lead nation' for 
peacekeeping training in the SADC region.51 This operation, which was the first to be 
mounted by the OPDS under the chairmanship of Zimbabwe, proved a major success for 
the security of the region. The first tangible evidence of regional cooperation for peace 
operations was presented when the Zimbabwe Defence Forces in conjunction with the 
British Government took the initiative in hosting a regional battalion-level peace 
operations field exercise from 1-20 April 1997.52 It involved a combined total of some 1 
400 members of the armed forces of ten of the twelve SADC countries, as well as civilian 
police observers and international humanitarian NGOs and agencies. The troop 
contributions varied from 400 Zimbabweans and 300 South Africans to one or two 
observers from Botswana and Zambia.53 
This operation became a success despite the fact that it experienced several problems 
regarding command and control, communications and radio procedures, and others. In 
fact, 
the lessons learned may now be used to enhance inter-operability, or the 
compatibility of various national forces in terms of weapons, equipment, doctrine, 
and command and control. The exercise also contributed to the building of mutual 
confidence among the region's armed forces. For example, although the SANDF 
has never been at war, the incursions of the former SADF into neighbouring 
countries and their two-decade occupation of Namibia are by no means 
forgotten. 54 

















Recently, both SA, Lesotho and Mozambican forces have mounted several cross border 
searches in the prevention of stock theft and other criminal related matters under OPDS. 
Thirdly, Summit recently tasked the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security with 
the responsibility to formulate a strategy for speeding up implementation of the DRC 
Agreement, in collaboration with the Joint Military Commission (JMC).'·55 SADC Organ 
working with the JMC and MONUC was able to complete this task successfully. The 
Organ was mandated to monitor the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan forces from 
the DRC by the United Nations. OPDS has ensured that both Ugandan and Rwandan 
forces withdrew from DRC according to the above mandate as quickly as possible. This 
task has since been completed hailing another success on the part of the OPDS. 
Despite the OPDS limitations, another SADC structure that was retained after the FLS 
was disbanded was the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC). This 
structure continued to meet informally at both official and ministerial level frequently. 
Van Nieuwkerk argued that the success of the ISDSC could be traced back to FLS. For 
instance, 
the ISDSC advised and implemented decisions of FLS Summit meetings. When 
the later was disbanded, the ISDSC was retained and its membership was 
expanded to include all SADC member states. Its objectives are to promote 
regional co-ordination and co-operation on matters related to security and defence 
and also to establish appropriate mechanism to this end.56 
This body formed part of the OPDS arm and is currently concentrating on multilateral 
military co-operation. This involves issues of military peace keeping, training and 
capacity building. It continues to build a database of information relating to cross border 
crimes such as small arms trade, illegal goods, drug-smuggling, public security and state 
security. However, like the OPDS, it has the major weakness of excluding civil society 
55 LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT ANC Today Joint Statement on ANC-Cosatu bilateral meeting, 12 
January 2002 in http://www.anc.org.zaJancdocs/pr/2002/prOI12.htmIVolume2.No. 3. 
56 Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk "Regionalism into Globalism? War into Peace? SADC and Ecowas Compared" 











and other non-state actors, while at the same time firmly controlling regional 
peacemaking and peacekeeping agendas.57 
2.4 The DRC and Lesotho Interventions 
Despite the above successes, the SA DC Organ was not able to prevent the first 
interventions in both the DRC and Lesotho by some member countries. Both these 
interventions were claimed to have been conducted on behalf of SADC. However, the 
evidence was not presented to justify this claim. 
It is still not clear as to whether the above principles and objectives of OPDC were 
operationalised in both cases. 
2.4.1 Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibian intervention in the DRC 
Several theories have been articulated to explain the Zimbabwean intervention in the 
DRC. Like the South African intervention in Lesotho these claims were both based on 
interests' calculations. 
In the case of Zimbabwe, the intervention was based on strategic, economic and political 
interests, despite the fact that a military solution to the crisis in DRC was not feasible. 
The civil war in the DRC in 1998 forced the embattled Kabila regime to appeal to the 
international community to help dislodge the rebel advance to Kinshasa. It recruited 
Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Chad and several non-state militias to avert an imminent 
collapse of the regime. The DRC civil war thus became international. Most of these 
participants did not only want to assist Kabila but they had special interests as well. 
Nevertheless, the involvement of SADC countries in this civil war outside the SADC 
mandate created a major challenge to the Organ itself. While the Chairperson of OPDS 
(Zimbabwe) claimed that they were conducting a peacekeeping role in the DRC, their 
actions did not support this claim. Firstly, there was no written agreement between the 
warring forces, which necessitated SADC peacekeeping forces. Secondly, the 
intervention was not conducted according to 1996 protocol of OPDS. Therefore, their 
peacekeeping role was not even sanctioned by SADC or the Summit itself which is the 












The argument goes that it was not feasible for Zimbabwe, to defy SADC, its citizens and 
the International Community by dispatching over 11000 army personnel out of its 30,000 
strong army if it was not benefiting from the whole exercise.58 It was further argued that 
the real interests of Zimbabwe have been disguised as a rescue mission but the truth of 
the matter was that, 
Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe is reported to have his sights set on Mbuji-
Mayi's diamond wealth. In addition, Congo's Kabila owes $40 to $200 million 
for military support. Zimbabwe would not trust neither Rwanda nor Uganda, if 
they come to power, to repay the debt Congo owes to Zimbabwe ... without 
Mbuji-Mayi (Zimbabwe's President) Mugabe has no reason to keep fighting; says 
a Western diplomat. His army didn't have a reason to start with, so they will 
really be glad to get OUt.59 
This intervention was therefore, driven by strict economic interests of the elite. Several 
media houses such as the Financial Times have provided an in-depth analysis of the 
Zimbabwean motivation to intervene in the DRC. The scope and magnitude of 
Zimbabwean economic interests have been considerable. Rather than Zimbabwean 
intervention being on political imperatives of rescuing another SADC member state, the 
results were on the contrary. The intervention strongly manifests empirical overtones of 
economic interests.60 
It is clear that Zimbabwean elites and their allies have turned the ORC civil war into a 
profitable business for themselves. The takeovers of Gecamines (by Zimbabweans 
operator Billy Rautenback) and oil reserves by Angolans as compensation for Kabila's 
debts to these countries were cases in point.61 
For another Zimbabwean SAOC partner in this war, President Nujoma, Namibian 
intervention like that of Zimbabwe in the ORC was to defend DRC sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. Nevertheless, this assertion, like that of Zimbabwe, was political 
rhetoric and nothing else. Oro gun argued that, 
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the Namibian government had plans to divert water from the river Congo across 
Angola to northern Namibia. Thus, by intervening on Kabila's behalf in the 
current Congo crisis, President Sam Nujoma, like President Mugabe of 
Zimbabwe, was trying to secure economic and vital resource benefits while 
advocating the political rhetoric of standing up to South Africa.62 
Similarly, Namibia had been equipping Kabila's government with military equipment to 
sustain the regime's war effort. While initially Namibia refused to acknowledge that it 
had been supplying arms to Congo, it finally agreed under much public pressure, but 
refused to confirm or deny accusations that it had sent its army into the ORe. 
Angola had a long history of involvement in the ORC. This was mostly related to its 
domestic conflicts with UNIT A (Union for the Total Independence of Angola) rebels said 
to be operating from ORC territory. From the 2nd August 1998, Angola had been 
supplying military weapons to the besieged Kabila government. It used its air power and 
troops to repel rebels from reaching Kinshasa and overthrowing Kabila's regime. Angola 
saw the toppling of Kabila by the Tutsi alliance as a direct threat to its security interests, 
since it believed that UNITA was going to have access to the ORC bases that might 
enable it to launch fresh attacks. Therefore, 
the Angolan government entered the war on the side of Kabila largely in order to 
act against UNIT A enclaves in the southern Congo. The government was 
understood to be opposed to any ceasefire that leaves a government friendly to 
UNIT A in place in the region.63 
The Angolan interest had been to block UNIT A at all costs from having military access 
and other logistical access from Congo. In like manner, it was more desirable to have a 
regime in Congo, which was friendly to the Angolan government. Kabila was identified 
as a genuine ally of Angola. 
62 Ibid, 36. 
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It was in MPLA's (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) interest to have 
Kabila in power in order to deny UNIT A this tactical advantage. 
The Angolan elite wanted to protect Angolan security interests, hence their involvement 
in this war. It was for this reason that they ignored to request SADC authorisation. 
Regional analysts saw these interventions as motivated by the DRC's natural resources, 
such as diamonds.64 These countries were largely motivated by realist calculations rather 
than their moral claim of rescuing a fellow SADC member state. They became embroiled 
in this conflict not for peacekeeping but to safeguard their interests. For Zimbabwe, the 
motive was basically business interests. In the case of Namibia, it was water interests, 
and for Angola it was security interests. All these cases reflect realist calculations on the 
part of these SADC countries. Their alleged peacekeeping operation was therefore based 
on these interests. 
2.4.2 South Africa and Botswana's intervention in Lesotho 
The 1998 May elections in Lesotho culminated in more disputes because the opposition 
parties questioned the validity of the results. The government and opposition parties 
sought mediation from South Africa to settle the disputes. A South African High Court 
Judge, Justice Pius Langa, headed the investigating commission.65The Langa 
Commission's findings created more anxiety and confusion among stakeholders in 
Lesotho. Despite its credible process and transparency, the report was mishandled.66 At 
first, the SA Deputy President Thabo Mbeki came to Lesotho ostensibly to present the 
Langa Commission report. 
Unfortunately, this did not happen. Instead, it was alleged that the report must be 
presented before Heads of Southern African Development Community (SADC) state 
meeting in Mauritius. It was not clear whether the report was finally presented at this 
Summit. Rumours were rife in Lesotho that the report was being "Doctored" and its 
findings manipulated in favour of the ruling party, before it was presented to all parties. 
64 Paul, S. Orogun, "Crisis of Government, Ethnic Schisms, Civil war, and Regional Destabilization of the 
democratic Republic of the Congo" World Affairs Vol. 165 (Summer 2002),25-41. 
65 Sehoai Santho, "Conflict Management and Post- Conflict Peace Building in Lesotho. In Crisis in Lesotho: 
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Subsequent to the above confusion, between the 10th and 16th September 1998, an Army 
mutiny broke up at the main Army barracks in Maseru. This exacerbated the fragile 
situation in the country. 
A situation of hopelessness and confusion ensued. Eventually, on the morning of the 22nd 
September 1998 the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) intervened in 
Lesoth067• They first went to the northern part of the country, the Katse Dam, where they 
shelled members of the Lesotho Defence Force guarding this strategic Dam which stored 
water enroute to the South African industrial heartland. Operation "Boleas," as it was 
called, then moved down to Maseru to handle the ongoing anarchy that was taking place. 
It is also worth noting that the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) arrived late on the second 
day of the operation. 
From South African official pronouncements, the intervention in Lesotho was justified in 
order to stop a military coup in process. They argued further that SA cannot allow a 
democratically elected government within its borders to be toppled by unconstitutional 
means. In justifying the intervention, SA claimed that it intervened in Lesotho on behalf 
of SADC after being invited by a legitimate government. 
The SA intervention in Lesotho has been subjected to many interpretations. The fact that 
the SA military went to Katse Dam before going to Maseru where there was an Army 
mutiny unfolding and anarchy in process was a key issue. Katse Dam is part of a massive 
Lesotho Highlands Water project whereby Lesotho would divert water from its mountain 
to slake the industrial thirst of Gauteng in exchange for substantial revenue, which could 
underwrite the financial base of its government.68 The South African government paid for 
this project and both SA and Lesotho stood to benefit. But, it is clear that the RSA is the 
primary beneficiary rather than Lesotho. 
In explaining the SA interest in this operation, it is important to focus our attention on the 
Lesotho Highlands Water Project. The Highlands water project formed the main element 
67 Theo Neethling, " Military Intervention in Lesotho: Perspectives on Operation Boleas and Beyond," in 
the Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution Issue 2.2 May I 999 ISSN 1522-21 IX, 
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of South Africa national interest. It was rational for SA to first secure the Dam before 
quelling the anarchy. In explaining the mandate of operation Boleas, the Acting South 
African President Mangosuthu Buthelezi argued that their objectives were three pronged, 
"to secure the Dam, restore order in the security establishment and clear protests from the 
Royal Palace".69 It was very clear where the South African interests were and what 
motivated their intervention in Lesotho. Water was the primary objective. Even the 
embattled Prime Minister of Lesotho did not claim that the water project was in danger 
when he invited SA to come and quell the alleged coups d'etat.7o 
SA decided to intervene to protect these interests. Realist theory teaches us that where 
state interests are concerned, issues of morality are not considered. According to realist 
theory, when states pursue their interests they may disregard international law in pursuit 
of their own interest. The history of international relations contains many examples 
where states have acted unilaterally outside the confines of international law. 
We must accept that, "according to foreign affairs officials, South Africa sent troops to 
Lesotho amongst others to defend Katse Dam".71 This was the result of indications that 
some Lesotho troops attempted to bombard the Katse dam after battling SA troops. 
Therefore, it can be argued that, "South Africa's intervention into Lesotho was thus 
driven more by material interests than political and humanitarian imperatives".72 We can 
confidently conclude that the SA intervention was influenced by realism. 
SADC peacekeeping role has not been clear, as the cases of the DRC and Lesotho have 
indicated. 
What weakened the case for intervention in both cases has been the lack of transparency 
and clarity in relation to when the consensus was reached to intervene. Lack of 
accountability and transparency in a decision of this magnitude serve only to erode 
SADC credibility as a regional body. This has raised questions relating to whether these 
countries have indeed abided by the 1992 SADC Treaty which "calls on its member 
69 Lambrechts Kato (ed) Foundation for Global Dialogue. Series No2. (1999),28. 
70 See both Khabele Matlosa, "The Lesotho Conflict: Major Causes and Management. In Crisis in Lesotho: 
The Challenges of Managing Conflict in Southern Africa", in Lambrechts Kato ed. Foundation for Global 
Dialogue. Series No2. (1999) 6-1 I. And Laurie Nathan, "Peacekeeping in South Africa. In Crisis in 
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for Global Dialogue, Series No2. (1999) 4-6. 
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states to promote peace and security, human rights, democracy, the rule of law and the 
peaceful settlement of disputes".73 The perceived lack of transparency and accountability 
has left a major hole in understanding of the above peacekeeping operations. These 
operations also raised questions of procedure, specifically as to whether proper 
procedures were followed or not. Similarly, issues concerning peaceful settlements of 
disputes have also been raised by these interventions, though the main question has 
always been which protocol sanctioned these interventions. 
In establishing the Organ on Politics Defence and Security, SADC formulated clear 
objectives and principles for this body to achieve, and yet the Organ's performance was 
hampered by the member states themselves. The interventions in DRC and Lesotho 
indicated clearly that member states were more interested in securing their own interests 
than promoting peace. Even though OPDS has some achievements since its inception in 
1996, they are not sufficient to conclude that the Organ has achieved most of its 
objectives. It is fair to indicate that there were some impediments, which hindered the 
Organ from achieving its goals. It is to these issues that we discuss in the following 
chapter. 
73 Francis Kornegay and Simon Chesterman" Southern Africa's Evolving Security Architecture: Problems 
and Prospects" in Proceedings of a conference in Program on Developing Regional and Sub-Regional 











Chapter Three: Why The Organ Has Failed 
3.0 Introduction 
SADC is not a superstate, but an institution of sovereign states that meets to formulate 
regional policies, which serve their interests. In such a community of states, an institution 
like OPDS, as a policy implementing body of SADC cannot be autonomous but is 
accountable to SADC Summit proper. From the earlier analysis, it is clear that the SADC 
Organ performance has been mixed. 
This chapter will examine the factors, which shaped the Organs performance including 
the lack of consensus and political will between member states to assist the Organ to 
function properly, member states lack of a unified strategy of ending conflicts in the 
region, despite the fact that 1996 protocol had clarified the way forward about how 
conflicts should be managed. 
The Organ failure was also exacerbated by an attempt to end conflicts through unilateral 
interventions. This strategy did not bode well for a new Organ like the OPDS. One other 
major factor, which contributed to the Organ failure, was the institutional confusion by 
some key member states such as Zimbabwe and South Africa. It was during this 
confusion that the Organ was not able to arrest the ensuing instability in both the DRC 
and Lesotho. Finally, the member states levels of development have been another factor 
that contributed to this failure. Member states were jealous about each other's economic 
successes and consequently became suspicious of each other. Therefore, it became 
difficult for members to deal with sensitive security matters while they lack confidence 
between themselves. 
3.1 Lack of Consensus and Political Will 
According to Christopher Landsberg and Mwesiga Baregu, Southern African 
Development Community "continued to be plagued by difficulties stemming from the 
lack of consensus among SADC member states regarding the OPDS statute in relation to 
Renaissance Institute the Southern African Regional Institute for Policy Studies and the Department of 











the SADC treaty,,74 The Organ's lack of autonomy has been inhibited by some member 
states misinterpretations of the 1996 protocol. This limitation was reflected by the 
disagreements, which emerged between SA and Zimbabwe, the Organ was unable to 
resolve these differences. It was these differences, which inspired the SA DC initiative to 
convene yet another Summit in March 2001 in Windhoek Namibia to address their 
differences over the functions of the Organ. The regional leaders ultimately made a 
breakthrough during this summit when they decided to integrate the OPDS into the 
SADC structure.75 
OPDS was intended to be flexible to be able to defuse and pre-empt potential conflicts. 
As an institutional mechanism of conflict management, it was designed to be efficient 
and effective in addressing these conflicts. Unfortunately this was not to be the case. 
OPDS is yet to achieve its objectives, which have not been operationalised fully to date. 
The lack of political will among the parties has led to delays in the implementation of the 
1996 protocol. 
This has made it difficult for the Organ to operate as an institution able to achieve its 
goals without hindrance from member states. 
3.2 The Lack of Unified Strategy of Ending Conflicts 
While SADC Organ principles and objectives were clear about how to end wars and what 
procedures must be followed, it appears that member states lack a concerted strategy to 
bring this to fruition. It has become difficult to operationalise these principles in the 
absence of consensus and political will within the member states. 
One major advantage that the European Community had from the beginning was the 
political will and consensus on how to prevent future European wars. These strategies 
were absent from SADC. Their absence made it difficult for SADC countries to develop 
concerted strategy for ending war in Angola. The main unresolved question was what 
could the Organ do to bring this protracted conflict to finality? The Angolan civil war 
"had escalated and threatened to engulf the region; this too, brought tension within the 
74 Christopher Landsberg and Mwesiga Baregu, From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security 













OPOS to the fore".76 The question had always been how to intervene in this country. It 
would appear that since SAOC was divided on the operations of OPOS, the region 
appeared reluctant to address the Angolan cont1ict. This was also exacerbated by the 
Angolan intervention in the ORC, the matter that had created much tension within the 
regIOn, and also the current ongoing role of the UN in that country. In general as long as 
the tension about DRC intervention still exists the OPOS appears not able to make 
headway on this issue. 
3.3 Unilateral Interventions 
Two years after its establishment, the OPDS, was challenged by two unilateral 
Interventions in the region in the DRC and Lesotho, creating stress and polarisation 
among member states. When Zaire became ORC under President Laurent Kabila, the 
country joined SADe. Kabila who won power after waging guerrilla warfare was backed 
by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia. The attainment of SADC membership by the DRC 
made it easier for these countries to come to Kabila assistance whenever his country was 
threatened. This happened in August 1998 when these countries intervened in the DRC to 
dislodge rebels who were threatening to topple the government. This intervention 
challenged the OPDS directly, because this Organ did not facilitate it The unilateral 
action of Zimbabwe and its allies was criticised by other SADC members, including 
South Africa as the chair of SADC, who advocated diplomatic solutions rather than war. 
This culminated in the failure of these countries to have a new SADC Executive 
Secretary nominated from either of their countries. Instead, a compromise candidate was 
nominated from Mauritius. 
These countries ignored SADC and OPDS when mounting this operation. They opted for 
direct military intervention and ignored South African calls for a diplomatic resolution to 
the DRC conflict.77 President Mugabe ignored both rebel and SAOC calls to cease 
hostilities and told the Zimbabwean state media that; "no one is compelled within SADC 
to go into a campaign of assisting a country beset by conflict". 78 
-------------
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He argued further that those who do not want to help should keep out, and not discourage 
those who want to help. 
In fact Mugabe's strategy, according to regional analysts, was to improve Kabila's 
bargaining position for negotiations that were hampered by the rebel captures of large 
areas of the DRC. This move to help Kabila at all costs by Mugabe and others appeared 
to have split SA DC member states. The chairman of SADC had to call the ceasefire in 
the fighting in DRC and also called an emergency SADC Summit to discuss peaceful 
resolution of DRC conflict. According to Reuters, Mandela argued that 
"we have been asked to call a Summit of SADC leaders .. .I want President Robert 
Mugabe (of Zimbabwe) to be involved,,,79 Mandela said in Cape Town. He also 
announced that he and Deputy President Thabo Mbeki had spoken to President Laurent-
Oesire Kabila on the telephone. "I am convinced we are making headway in bringing 
about a peaceful solution,,,gO 
Mandela was aware of deep disagreements, which appeared destined to fragment SAOC 
and weaken the OPOS. Therefore, the ORC situation has illuminated tensions around 
several issues; 
a) Autonomy (the relationship between OPOS and SAOC Summit); 
b) The legal framework in which OPOS should be operating; and 
c) The hegemonic power struggles in the post liberation, post apartheid era.8! 
Not only did the South African government refuse to join the military intervention, but it 
was also very vocal in denouncing the intervention. The country was at pains to 
emphasise that as chair of the SAOC, it regarded no other alternative to a diplomatic 
solution of the ORC conflict. 
79 Ibid, 2. 
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Despite the above SA protestations against Zimbabwean intervention in the DRC, on 
September 22nd 1998, South Africa and Botswana intervened in Lesotho. They argued 
that they had mounted the military intervention under the auspices of the SADC Organ, 
the OPDS.~2 This operation it was later claimed followed consultations between the 
governments of Mozambique and Zimbabwe before it was launched.s3 Operation Boleas 
as the intervention was called had been criticised from different quarters tor violating the 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lesotho, and also the OPDS protocol. For instance, 
John Seiler84 argued that SADC policy of regional efforts and mitiatives in containing 
intra-interstate conflicts was still in a drafting stage therefore the intervention could not 
be regarded as legitimate. Secondly, the Acting SA State President Buthelezi 
consultations with SADC member states were purely informal and done through 
telephone communication. Ironically he did not speak with President Robert Mugabe, 
who was the current head of OPDS. In fact in justifying operating outside the OPDS 
mechanism, Buthelezi argued that there was no time for further negotiations, because 
economic coercion and threats of force mounted on Lesotho government leaders, their 
property and their lives were at risk. 85 
In response to the above criticisms, South African officials were at pains to indicate that a 
legitimate government requested the intervention. On the other hand, the significance of 
this intervention was its lack of reference to international law on interventions and the use 
of force. In fact both South African and Lesotho officials were inconsistent about which 
relevant provisions of the UN charter were consulted. 86 It was this unilateralism that has 
defeated the smooth operation of the OPDS. In fact, Nathan argued further that, 
82[bid. 
the SADC decision to not allow coups in the region had in fact been a proposal 
from the ISDSC to the SADC Summit; the proposal had included the proviso that 
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UN, OAU and SADC approval be obtained prior to any military intervention; the 
Summit had neither endorsed the ISDSC's proposal nor authorised military action 
in Lesotho; and, in the absence of Summit approval, the decision by the two 
neighbouring states to launch the operation was inconsistent with SADC's 
decision-making rules.87 
This operation highlighted the absence of agreed rules and also complexity in decision-
making within the Organ when it comes to legal, military and political matters for 
undertaking collective enforcement action by the institution. 
3.4 Institutional Confusion 
For the first time since its inception, "SADC showed signs of severe stress when South 
Africa and Zimbabwe were at loggerheads over how best to address Southern Africa's 
security challenges".88 Member states soon began to confuse the role of the Organ as an 
institution by equating it with that of SADC. 
They forgot that like other sectors, which were accountable to the Summit, the Organ as 
well is in fact a creature of the Summit. 
In the first instance, the prefix SADC that had been attached to the Organ explicitly 
meant that the Organ is part of SADC. Ever since the Organ was established, it had 
become the institutional framework of security cooperation within SADC. It has also 
used the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (lSDSC) of the disbanded Front 
Line States as its institutional memory and ad hoc secretariat. The ISDSC was therefore 
declared to be an institution of the Organ. Therefore, according to pitso,89 the ISDSC, 
even though it has no permanent structure, comprises Ministerial Council and three Sub-
committees, on Defence, Security and Intelligence respectively. Subordinate to the 
Defence Sub-committee are three functional committees: the Operations Sub-committee, 
the Standing Maritime Committee and the Standing Aviation Committee. The Operations 
87 Ibid, 79. 
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Sub-committee, in turn, consists of structures focussing on (military) intelligence, 
logistics, personnel, communications, legal affairs, chaplaincy, and medical affairs. 
Initially, the Organ was expected to report directly to SADC Heads of State Summit, 
which is the supreme policy-making body of SADC in terms of its 1992 Treaty. 
However, the protocol through which the Organ was established departed from this 
provision of the Treaty. Contrary to the spirit of the July 1994 conference in Windhoek, 
the Organ operates at Summit, Ministerial and technical levels with its own chair and 
functions independently from other SA DC structures. 
However, it is also important to look at the decision-making apparatus and compare these 
processes with other Organs. While this may not be a new feature for a growing Organ, 
which still has to find its place within the region, it is fair to argue that it shares several 
institutional similarities with other security Organs of this nature. For instance, when 
compared with other regional Organs in Africa, OPDS shares most similarities with the 
ECOW AS. In tenns of decision-making, the Summit remains the supreme decision 
making body in this regard. Both Organs are accountable to the community and as such 
do not enjoy autonomy. Therefore, they fom1 part of their regional structure.90 
SADC Organ until recently has been functioning independently under the chainnanship 
of President Robert Mugabe. He had ehaired the Organ since its inception in 1996 in 
Botswana. This was "to fill the void left after the Frontline States dissolved in 1994,,91 
and the longest serving statesman was elected by the Summit to fill this position. The 
Zimbabwean Ministry of Foreign Affairs also administered the Organ on behalf of 
SADC. 
3.4.1 The Emergence of the Impasse 
The relationship of the Organ within the whole SADC has always been complex. This 
was as a consequence of the current disagreements between SA and Zimbabwe. The fact 
that SADC members agreed that the Organ should operate at the summit level created 
more problems than was anticipated. 
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This major problem of SA DC was that it became split in two areas. That is the security 
leg and the socio-economic leg. Therefore, Breytenbach argued that, 
the chairmanship was to rotate (but never did); the ISDSC became the secretariat 
(separate from the SADC secretariat in Gaborone). A Summit was introduced 
(mandated) in the communique, but a second Summit within SADC was not 
sanctioned by the SADC Treaty of 1992.92 
The 1996 protocol emphatically emphasised that OPDS shall operate at the Summit level, 
independent from other structures. This presupposes that SADC had two Chairpersons, 
one for SADC as a regional body and the other for the Organ. The justification of this 
structural conflict between the Organ and the Summit by having two Chairpersons was 
that the Organ required an ad hoc flexible approach in order to respond expeditiously to 
regional conflicts. The tradition has been that SADC discusses political issues at the 
regional level and the creation of another Chairperson was seen as a duplication of effort 
that might create unnecessary tensions and operational problems. South Africa was vocal 
in indicating that SADC was not meant to have two Chairpersons. To suggest that an 
Organ like SADC be chaired by a different Chairperson and also OPDS was to bring 
unnecessary competition and undue organisational rivalries with bifurcation of goals 
between the two Organs. It was also argued that the Chairperson of the Organ should 
report directly to the SADC Summit and the SADC Chairperson. This simmering tension 
came to the public domain in the heated 1997 Summit whereby President Mandela 
threatened to resign the SADC chair. He was vehemently opposed to Mugabe's 
monopoly of the Organ, which he wanted to chair indefinitely. The dispute revolved 
around the implementation of Gaborone Protocol which "reads that the Organ shall 
'function independently' from other SADC structures".93 
92 Ibid. 
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It also argued that the Organ should report to the Summit. It was this section of the 
communique, which confused Zimbabwe completely. For instance, "Zimbabwe, the chair 
of SADC Organ since it was established, interpreted this to mean that the SADC Organ 
should function totally independent of SADC proper".94 Therefore, Zimbabwe argued 
that it should be an independent institution capable of holding its own Summits separate 
from those ofSADC.95 
For Zimbabwe the Organs should operate separately but parallel to the body in 
accordance with the 1996 Summit, which established the Organ. Mugabe argued that 
SADC was donor-funded body, which was susceptible to foreign influence.96 Therefore, 
security was a very sensitive issue, which could not be subordinated to donor influence. 
He added that there could be too much interference and in any case the Organ needed to 
be headed by a long serving SADC leader. Zimbabwe argued further that members of the 
Organ are also members of the SADC and it would be improper for members of the 
OPDS to report to the SA DC Summit while all were both members of this body.97 
The impasse between President Mandela and President Mugabe indicted that 
OrganiSADC relations were very complicated. 
According to Mugabe the Organ operates independently from SADC while Mandela 
took a different view as the Chair of SA DC. 
In actual fact, "Pretoria argued that issues of politics, defence and security were too 
sensitive and important to be effectively left to one member state.,,98 There appears to be 
no problem for the Organ to be accountable to the chair and SADC Summit because this 
body is a SADC creation after all. In fact all heads of states make decisions relating to 
SADC structures including the Organ. Therefore, "any fears about the separate SADC 
Organ Summit being abused by the SADC Organ Chairman are unfounded",99 because 
decision chains as envisaged by SADC Gaborone Communique mostly relating to 
interstate issues cannot be unilaterally taken without consultation with all member states 
94 Ibid. 
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of SADC. In tenns of the SADC Organ, the Chainnan of SADC must first consult the 
Troika whose decision must be endorsed by the Summit. 
3.4.2 Consequences of the Impasse 
These differing views have important policy implications. Under these circumstances, 
who makes policy regarding interventions? Can policy be fonnulated where both chairs 
hold diametrically different positions? 100 This impasse precipitated one of the most 
fundamental failures of the Organ on Politics Defence and Security. 
These tensions also trickled down to the operational level. To the Operational 
Commanders it was not clear who they should report to: the SADC Chairperson or the 
Organ's Chairperson? These are difficult questions for mounting any peacekeeping 
operations. 
With the impasse around the Organ and SADC it would be very difficult to mount any 
operation under these circumstances. It has become impossible to detennine who should 
be appointed to lead the operation. 
Therefore, this impasse has crippled the OPDS completely. It remains a major challenge 
to see how the Organ shall be operational under the prevailing conditions. It appears that 
the Organ relations with SADC as a whole have become untenable. The Organ has not 
been able to mount an operation on its own or under SADC support. However, the two 
interventions in the DRC and Lesotho were alleged to have been conducted under the 
auspices of SADC. This raises a lot of legitimacy questions. These questions lead us to 
conclude that the Organ was not operational during these interventions. 
3.4.3 The Resolution of the Impasse 
In order to address these differences relating to Organ relations with SADC, member 
states devised a new strategy of resolving this conflict. It was on the basis of the above 
challenges that SADC adopted a new thinking. This approach necessitated member states 
to delegate Swaziland to review OPDS and make necessary recommendations to the 
SADC Summit. However, in undertaking this task, Swaziland had to work in close 
consultation with member states. By 2000, member states were engaged in multilateral 












functions. They persevered to find appropriate formal mechanisms to operationalise 
objectives of collective security in the divided region.101 
Zacarias argued that even though there have been several claims that certain activities 
have taken place within the OPDS, this argument lacks credence in the sense that 
none of these activities, however, can be said to have taken place within the 
framework defined by the SADC or the OPDS. Rather, they were a result of ad 
hoc agreements between departments, top officials of departments, or ministers 
responsible for those specific portfolios in the countries involved and heads of 
state acting outside the structures of SADC 102 
As a departure from the then existing structure and in order to ameliorate divisions within 
SADC major powers therefore, 
the leaders decided that OPDS would not be accountable to the chair country of 
the structure but to the heads of states and government. The OPDS will be 
integrated in the SADC structures but coordinated at the Summit level, and it will 
rotate on an annual and troika basis reporting to the chairperson of the Summit. I03 
Furthermore, another structure was established which will regulate the functions and 
operations of the OPDS. This was a new protocol on Politics Defence and Security Co-
operation. The decision of this Summit heralded and affirmed regional commitment 
towards collective security and collective accountability.lo4 This decision was adopted 
and ratified at Malawi, Blantyre in August 2001. The OPDSC was placed firmly under 
SADC and the Organ was now called Organ on Politics, Defence and Security 
Cooperation (OPDSC).105 The OPDSC was to have its own structures, which will be 
served by the SADC secretariat as well. This structure was accorded a mandate to 
formulate and implement regional security policies. According to this treaty 
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the OPDSC will operate on a troika basis, with the troika members to be selected 
by the Summit. However, the chairperson of the Summit cannot at the same time 
have the chair of the SADC summit. 106 
The protocol went further to prescribe functions of the Ministers who will be involved in 
this protocol. It argued that a Ministerial Committee consisting of Ministers responsible 
for Public Security, or State, Defence, Foreign Affairs and Security would form the 
membership of OPDSC. Currently, the chairperson of the Organ is Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe as an outgoing chair and Tanzania as an incoming Deputy chair, both serve as 
a troika of the OPDSC 107• This protocol also provided for the establishment of inter-state 
Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC), which is composed of all SADC foreign 
Ministers. It is envisaged that their main functions would be the promotion of diplomacy 
within the OPDSC, which currently has an elaborate set of defence subcommittees. 
The protocol also established within Ministers of Public Security the Southern African 
Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO). This structure has a 
permanent secretariat hosted by Interpol sub- regional Bureau of Southern Africa in 
Harare. Among others functions "the protocol also provides a framework for SADC 
policies and activities to promote, defend, and consolidate democracy, peace, security 
and stability". 108 
The above confusion was further exacerbated by the perceived differences of 
development levels within the member states. Thus jealousies arose as some eountries 
saw other economies prospering while their own economies were lacking behind. 
3.5 Different Levels of Development 
When Southern African countries formed SADC, they were all at different levels of 
development. 
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They became aware that economic development cannot be achieved or even sustained 
unless there is "peace, stability and concomitant move towards democracy ~ part and 
parcel of an approach to emancipate the market, increase trade and reduce trade barriers 
within the region".,o9 Nevertheless, this reality has complicated relations between SADC 
countries. 
Tense relations over the mechanics of the OPDS were also exacerbated by political and 
economic strains. This tension came almost to the boiling point when several member 
states even accused South Africa of pursuing selfish and inimical economic and 
inhospitable migration policies. I 10 Some member states have become very sceptical about 
each other's actions, more especially regarding economic management and levels of 
democratisation. 
These embedded tensions came to the fore in 1994 after South Africa became the newest 
member of SADC. Some members notably Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia became 
even more suspicious of SA. This came as no surprise because some SADC members are 
among "the poorest nations in the world, with a declining share in the global economic 
product~a paltry 0, 58 percent in 1993, or 0, 13 percent without South Africa's input".llI 
[t was not surprising that some of these countries viewed SA as pursuing inimical 
policies. Therefore, SA as an economic and military power in the region has raised more 
concerns to some of these countries. It was as a result of these tensions that some 
countries supported Zimbabwean intervention In the DRC while others remained 
opposed, and supported SA diplomatic approach. 
[n terms of trade, SADC members fear fair competition with SA. In fact their economies 
cannot even compete with that of South Africa. Trade has become a major foreign policy 
concern in the region. South Africa was accused by its neighbours of not allowing access 
to its market. Among the countries, which were most vocal, were Zambia, Zimbabwe and 
Mauritius. These countries were "complaining about South Africa's positive trade 
balance with the rest of the region and alleging unfair trade practices by South African 
109 Jakkie Cilliers, "The SADC Organ For Defence, Politics and security," in Institute for Defence Policy 
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businesses in cooperation with the government.,,112 This conflict reflects lack of 
confidence and trust between member states. Therefore, it has serious implications for the 
SADC Organ to operate efficiently and effectively. Member states must have confidence 
and trust in order to graft a common defence policy, which will be implemented 
impartially by the OPDSC. While these suspicions remain, the goal is nevertheless, 
difficult to achieve. 
However, the trade disputes spread to Zimbabwe. For instance, in March 1997, "the 
cement war occurred between Zambia and Zimbabwe, after Zimbabwe unilaterally 
. d h' d .c: Z b' ,,113 Increase t e Import uty on cement lrom am la. 
The impact of these actions affects SADC directly because mutual trust and confidence is 
critical for OPDS to work within the region with member states. The Organ cannot 
function properly under the environment of mistrust and lack of confidence among 
member states. 
The 1996 SADC Finance and Investment report, which was produced for SADC by 
South Africa, accentuated these suspicions between South Africa and Zimbabwe. The 
report alleged that 
Zimbabwe's GDP in 1995 had declined by 10 percent-an allegation that was 
untrue ... A formal apology was delivered to Zimbabwean government the next 
day by South African Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo, South African Finance 
Minister Chris Liebenberg, and SADC Executive Secretary Kaire Mbuende. 114 
An enquiry into these events was launched and further apology was demanded and South 
Africa had to deliver it once again. For the Zimbabwean Foreign Ministry, the above 
distortions of facts were nothing but a conspiracy meant to undermine both SADC and 
Zimbabwe. 
These events have contributed to declining confidence levels within SADC member 
states and consequently have affected the Organ operations. If members of the region 
view each other with so much suspicion they cannot work closely on sensitive military 
112 Tandeka C. Nkiwane, "The Quest for Good Governance," in Christopher Landsberg and Mwesiga 
Baregu, From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges; A project of the 
International Peace Academy, ed. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers 2003),66. 











issues. This mistrust led to the April 1999, "Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola and the DRC 
concluding a Defence Treaty without official notice to SAOc."II' This treaty provided 
that an attack on one of the signatories would be regarded as an attack to alL The treaty 
also affirmed that they would train together and conduct their own collective operatIOns. 
It has been this treaty, which among other factors contributed to the failure of the Organ. 
The Organ failed because of these factors identified above. However, among its 
principles, the Organ is expected to promote democratisation and settlement of disputes 
through peaceful means within the region. The next chapter will evaluate to what extent 
the Organ has been able to achieve these objectives. 
II~ Ibid, 66. 
115Nathan, Lauric (2002) "Organ Failure"; A Review of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and 
Security; In Regional Integration for Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in Africa; ed. Laakso Liisa 
(Regional Integration for Conflict Prevention and peace Building in Africa, Europe, SADC and ECOWAS. 











Chapter Four: The Organ and Regional Political Trends 
4.0 Introduction 
SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Protocol enshrines principles of 
democracy, good governance and human rights. The OPDS was therefore designed to 
protect these values. The chapter will examine problem cases which deviated from these 
values, analyse the Organ response to these problems and make a conclusion in relation 
to what extent did the Organ succeeded in protecting these democratic values. 
4.1 The values the OPDS was designed to protect 
The OPDS was established to protect several values in the region. As a subsidiary body 
of SADC, the OPDS was subject to the same principles and values of SADC. According 
to Venter the OPDS was designed to "ensure sovereign equality of all member states, the 
peaceful settlement of disputes, the safeguarding of human rights, the advancement of 
democracy, and the observance of the rule of law.,,116 These were the fundamental rules, 
which serve to guide the Organ to evolve, protect and promote common political values 
that will eventually lead to the promotion of peace and security in the region. 
The 1996 Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security Co-operation, argued that the 
Organ was designed bearing in mind that chapter VIII of the UN Charter recognises the 
role of regional arrangements in dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of 
international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action. 
It also recognised the above issues illustrated by Venter and went further to recall the 
1964 resolution of the Assembly of heads of States and Governments of the OAU, 
declaring that all member States pledge to respect the borders existing on their 
achievement of national independence. The Protocol reaffirmed the primary 
responsibility of the UN Security Counci I in the maintenance of international peace and 
security and the role of the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution. The Protocol emphasised that it was convinced 
that peace, security and strong political relations are critical factors in creating a 
116 Dennis Venter, "Regional Security in Southern Africa," in The Political Economy of Peace and Security 












conducive environment for regional co-operation and integration. It argued that the Organ 
constituted an appropriate institutional framework by which member States could co-
ordinate policies and activities in the area of politics, defence and security. It was 
Protocol determination to achieve solidarity, security and peace in the region through 
close co-operation in the above areas and promote at all times peaceful settlement of 
disputes by negotiation, conciliation, mediation or arbitration. ll7These were some of the 
values the OPDS was designed to protect and safeguard. 
Since the advancement of democracy also promotes good governance and Human rights 
culture, Dahl argued that democratisation ought to meet the following institutional 
requirements, 
elected representation, free and fair elections, political parties, inclusive suffrage, 
and the right to run for office, freedom of expression (i.e. free press), 
associational autonomy, and the rule of law, an efficient bureaucracy and 
development based on a market economy. I 18 
What is important is that the state itself must be subjected to law. In further defining 
democracy Sartori argued that "in a democracy no one can choose himself, no one can 
invest himself with power to rule, and therefore no one can abrogate himself 
unconditional and unlim ited power" .119 
The principles and objectives of the SADC Organ confonn to the above perspective. 
1996 Protocol in its objectives argued that the Organ shall promote the development of 
democratic institutions and practices within the territories of state parties and encourage 
the observance of universal human rights as provided for in the Charters and Conventions 
ofthe Organisation of African Unity and United Nations respectively. 120 
Furthennore a survey by the Consortium of research institutions working under a 
programme called Southern African Democracy Barometer (SAD B) was carried out in 
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late 1999 and early 2000 in Namibia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, South Africa and Zambia. 
The latter reflected a similar trend of popu lar "strong resistance to the idea of returning to 
the authoritarian past; whether it be colonialism, white minority rule, indigenous one-
party rule or military dictatorship".121 Nevertheless, it would appear that both the OPDS 
principles and objectives have proved to be too ambitious and idealistic. 
4.2 Lack of Democracy in Zimbabwe, Swaziland and the DRC. 
Despite OPDS noble intentions, the SADC region is consistently facing challenges of 
authoritarianism from member states such as Swaziland, Zimbabwe, and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC). 
This was despite the fact that the Organ laid down clear and unequivocal guidelines of 
good governance and human rights. There are no known cases whereby the OPDS 
succeeded in promoting democratisation and political stability within the region. It is 
these limitations that we now discuss. 
4.2.1 Zimbabwe 
The 2002 Zimbabwean elections were conducted under a highly charged environment of 
severe intimidation. This has led to major opposition parties disassociating themselves 
from the elections results. It would appear that democracy has been hijacked by the ruling 
party in this country against the will of the majority. 
In Zimbabwe, three years after independence, in 1983, the security apparatus and 
authoritarian state were swiftly operationalised and developed by President Mugabe in 
Matebeleland. Mugabe unleashed a military contingent known as the Fifth Brigade. He 
systematically initiated the first repression programme under democratic rule in 
Matebeleland. The Fifth Brigade was an army contingent trained by North Korea. This 
army was 
trained for unquestioning loyalty, it operated outside the normal military 
hierarchy, and answered directly to Mugabe. Under Colonel Perence Shiri, the 











Unit was responsible for mass murders, torture, and property burnings In the 
communal areas of Northern Matebeleland. 122 
Matebeleland was the opposition stronghold. Members of the opposition were persecuted 
and according to the Catholic Church, over 2000 civilians were killed, thousands were 
beaten, their houses destroyed, public executions became a norm in this area. 
Lack of democratic values within the ruling Mugabe regime can be traced to the above 
period. The opposition parties were incapacitated through unfair constitutional and 
electoral laws, which rendered the process meaningless. Among 150 Zimbabwean 
parliamentary seats for instance, 30 are selected by the President who also, 
appoints the members of the Electoral supervisory Commission-usually serving 
or retired Officials-who are answerable to him. The Registrar General is a 
presidential appointee, responsible, for instance, for maintaining the voters roll, 
unfettered by any legal obligation that the list be open to scrutiny.123 
In fact in 1995 over 100,000 voters had to be turned away because the voting was 
chaotic and the voter's roll was problematic. 
Most of these voters were unable to say whether their names were in the register or not. 
The government of Zimbabwe introduced the Political Parties Financial Act after 
successfully persuading Joshua Nkomo to join ZANU party and thus establishing ZANU-
PF. The Act funded political parties with more than 15 seats in parliament. The ruling 
party benefited handsomely from this legislation. Apart from these financial benefits, the 
party controlled the state media houses and aggressively promoted ZANU-PF ideology in 
complete disregard of other parties. 
In terms of Human rights in Zimbabwe, the executions of people in death row were 
processed in fast manner to the extent that the international community became 
concerned. In fact Kenneth Good argued further that, 
122 Kenneth Good," Dealing with Despotism: The People and the Presidents, Zimbabwe's Presidential 
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the President's increasing authoritarianism and his disdain for human rights 
through this period was evident in many areas ... A ruling party Official who 
murdered opposition supporter was pardoned, and by the mid-1990s, 56 or 57 
people were believed to have been executed. 124 
Mugabe went further to give permanent residence to Mengistu (a former Ethiopian 
dictator) who escaped from war crimes charges in Ethiopia. Between 1987 and 2000, 
Mugabe had amended the Zimbabwean constitution more than 16 times. 125 However, 
three days after loosing the 2000 referendum, he unleashed on the 16 February war 
veterans to occupy commercial farms. The campaign to confiscate farmland was "spear-
headed by self-styled war veterans (of the liberation struggle), whom President Mugabe 
had promoted and mobilised behind himself and his interests.,,126 [n fact around March 
2000 more than 500 farms were occupied and by November the same year, 1700 were 
also confiscated. President Mugabe informed the nation that the government would not 
interfere; the era of anarchy had arrived. Farm workers were assaulted, and killed, 
property destroyed, the police remained inactive and "when High court and Supreme 
court declarations were obtained ordering the removal of the occupiers, the executive and 
police took no steps to implement the orders,,127 The whole campaign was geared towards 
frustrating opposition supporters. Land expropriation went ahead regardless of court 
rulings. 
State sponsored intimidation and violence escalated by June 24-25 2000 parliamentary 
elections. The resignation of a High court Judge James Robertson Devittie after making a 
ruling nullifying results of Zimbabwe's June 2000 parliamentary elections in three 
constituencies, reflected lack of democratic values by the Mugabe regime. Furthermore, 
Devittie's resignation comes in the wake of the resignation of the Chief Justice, 
Justice Anthony Gubbay who was pressured into taking an early retirement by the 
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government after passing a series of ruling, which were deemed to be against the 
country's land redistribution policy.128 
In relation to the above events, The Commonwealth Secretariat reported that there was 
violence and intimidation in both rural and urban areas against voters supporting the 
opposition as part of government strategy to diminish the opposition. In fact 
systematic intimidation was supplemented by electoral manipulation on a large 
scale. Constitution was gerrymandered, the electoral role is out of date, and 
ZANU hack is in charge of the count. A local human rights group found that 25 
per cent of the names on the voters roll were either fictitious, listed repeatedly, or 
those of the dead.129 
Several international bodies confirmed that the roll was manipulated and full of errors. 
The United Nations Team also confirmed these findings. Towards the end of 200 I and 
before the 2002 Presidential elections, Mugabe introduced laws, which banned several 
international elections observer groups such as the European Union, The Carter Centre, 
American observer group and the International foundation for elections systems. All 
these 
draconian laws were being pushed through parliament. .. all but banned political 
gatherings, free speech and the right to strike. Parliament had banned 
Zimbabweans overseas from voting, removing about 500,000 people-one in ten 
potential voters-from the rolls ... other new laws made it harder for young people 
to register to vote. l3O 
There was even more evidence that indicated that government supporters could vote 
many times. Members of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) were 
assaulted and 13 killed by ZANU-PF militia popularly known as terror Teens. 
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Despite 2002 Zimbabwean elections, which created a lot of controversy, the role of 
OPDS never came to prominence. Baregu argued that, 
in Zimbabwe, the relationship between the opposition Movement for Democratic 
Change and President Robert Mugabe's government spilled over into serious 
tensions and violence, even after highly disputed elections of March 2002, in 
which Mugabe was accused of using legitimate questions over land for political 
gain. 131 
The OPDSC was still nowhere to be seen. These instances have actually challenged the role 
of this Organ and of course the role of SADC as well. The role of SADC and OPDSC was 
that of complete indifference. Members of SADC aligned themselves 
with the government of Zimbabwe. For instance, 
President Thabo Mbeki appeared to have no knowledge of electoral malpractice 
and wide-scale illegality as the June parliamentary elections approached, and had 
no interest in acquiring it either. 132 
In fact South Africa and other SADC members dismissed early warnings of simmering 
dangerous conflict as speculative. As the international Community suspended aid to 
Zimbabwe, in a SADC Summit in Namibia, "Deputy President Jacob Zuma declared that 
the Zimbabwean President had convincingly explained that supposed redistribution 
would not affect commercial farming.,,133 
Member states were in support of this Zimbabwean view. For Mozambican President 
and Chair of OPDSC, described Mugabe as a comrade and as "master and champion of 
the rule of law. Mismanagement in land redistribution, for him (Chissano) and Mbeki 
agreed was the fault, not only of colonialism and racism, but also of foreign donors.,,134 
In fact President Chissano in accentuating what he called the root causes of Zimbabwean 
crisis 
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even went further to inform the BBC television that "Mugabe was defending his people's 
democratic rights, accusations that Mugabe had enriched himself at the expense of his 
people were untrue.,,135 In order to investigate the above accusations of Mugabe, SA DC 
appointed a six men delegation to look at these claims. They however, "reiterated support 
for Mugabe's land policies, in December 2001, and declared their opposition to sanctions 
because, the Malawian Foreign Minister claimed, they would 'hurt' -not save-'the whole 
region". 136 
The South African Foreign Minister and her Deputy opposed the imposition of sanctions 
against Zimbabwe and condemned any threats of imposing international sanctions. They 
argued that sanctions were not in the regional interests and at the end of the day what 
SADC says count. SADC delegates who were observing 2002 Zimbabwe's Presidential 
elections were evasive in their account of the elections. In most cases they did not even 
recognise that these elections were conducted under environment of violence and 
intimidation. The South African Mission in their press conference argued that their 
"mission did not witness instances of violence.,,137 The Namibian delegation together 
with SADC Ministerial Forum in their press statements on March 9th 2002 "argued that 
the violence had been exaggerated by the international media and that they were satisfied 
with the elections at that point.,,138 The SADC parliamentary Forum press conference 
created a furore. Their conference was postponed three times. It was clear that the team 
had fundamental differences. The delegates from Tanzania, Angola and Namibia were 
arguing tor a less critical report while majority members were arguing for a more critical 
reporting of events as a whole. The SADC Forum eventually convened their press 
conference in which they argued that "because of the climate of insecurity in Zimbabwe 
since 2000 parliamentary elections, the electoral process could not be said adequately 
comply with the norms and standards for elections in the region.,,139 Conversely, South 
African delegation called them legitimate. These different versions were made despite the 
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alarming violence and intimidation that characterised the elections and also despite the 
fact that Zimbabwe lacks an independent body, which administer and control electoral 
process and conflict management. 
Despite having held regular elections, Zimbabwe represent a worst scenario in terms of 
democratisation index and political rights assessment; Breytenbach, argued that 
according to Freedom House, 
political rights in Zimbabwe dropped to six in 2002, a score normally associated 
with autocracies. Its civil liberties are also scored at six. The electoral democracy 
in this country had clearly not prevented the erosion of civil and political liberties 
during this period, dropping to the level of dictaduras. 14o 
However, member countries had not yet been able to operationalise the Organ more 
especially its objectives and principles for fear that they might be used against them. 
4.2.2 Swaziland 
In 1973, King Sobhuza II of Swaziland issued a royal degree banning political parties. 
However, this action was temporarily suspended. Subsequently, the banning order was 
re-imposed in 1997 by King Mswati III, thus making Swaziland, yet again an executive 
Monarchical country and a typical autocracy.141 The Leader of Swaziland appears keen to 
delay democracy on the pretext that the country is about to introduce a new constitution 
that will address its citizen's political aspirations. Swaziland Democratic Alliance (SDA), 
which consists of labour unions and political organisations that have been banned by 
royal fiat for the past 30 years, wants the state of emergency prohibiting political activity 
lifted and constitutional convention with elected representatives be convened. 142 Civil 
liberties are conspicuously absent and there is still no Bill of human rights in Swaziland. 
In fact press freedom in Swaziland came under scrutiny in May 4, 200 I, when 
government issued an order shutting down one Swaziland newspaper, The Guardian of 
Swaziland and The National Magazine. In order to implement these measures "the Police 
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were deployed to impound copies of The Guardian". 143These papers were seen as 
damaging the Institution of the Monarchy. Therefore, 
on two occasions, the government had ordered the closure of The Swazi observer 
for failure to comply with state political demands. In 1999, the entire workforce 
of journalists was sacked when the government ordered the closure of the 
Swaziland observer. 144 
Nonetheless, it has been claimed that the Swazi Monarch would ratify the draft 
constitution by October 2003, because it expressed the views of the Swazi majority. The 
Constitutional Review Commission, which was set up by the King, was mostly composed 
of his relatives hence "The king should not be advised by his brothers. Princes and 
Princesses have a vested interest in royal matters." 145 Most people who have been 
consulted by the commission were local, regional and national leaders. Mostly the royal 
family composes this section of the Swazi society. Nevertheless 
a desire for a democratically elected government was raised by people who 
wished to vote for national leaders like the Prime Minister directly, via a secret 
ballot. The draft constitution calls for palace appointment of the Prime Minister, 
cabinet, and most national and regional leaders, as well as all chiefs. 146 
This was contrary to the Prince's interest which was why the draft Constitution left out 
these democratic views, because the constitution proposes the government which runs the 
country for the benefit of the King who appoints the Prime Minister, but not the 
government which is popularly elected and works for the people's interests. The Prince's 
position was clear that is, if the draft was to reflect these dissenting views, the position of 
the Monarchy would have been seriously impaired. This would undermine Royal 
authority, and it is why the palace refuses to allow political parties to operate. 
Furthermore, 
143 Renaissance: A Review of Democracy and Government in Southern Africa Vol. I. ~o9 (2001), lO. 
144 Ibid. 
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other Swazi's are showing no hesitancy in making their views known to the 
constitutional delegation. This has raised further doubts about the palace's claim 
that an overwhelming majority of Swazi's agree with what is in the draft 
constitution. 147 
The Prince's Constitutional Review Commission did not hold public hearings when it 
collected views on governance from the people. According to the Swaziland branch of 
Women in Law in Southern Africa, 
Submissions were held in secret. The press was barred. There was no independent 
accounting of what was said. When the Constitutional Commission's report was 
presented to King Mswati, it contained no data on how many people made 
submissions, or a percentile breakdown of how many people subscribed to 
different views. 148 
A member of the Commission, Attorney 000 Aphane of The Swaziland Law Society, in 
further supporting the undemocratic nature of this consultative process that was 
undertaken by the Commission, noted that, "We collected stories from people who were 
coached to say certain things." 149 Nevertheless, the chairperson of the commission Prince 
Mangaliso insisted that "an overwhelming majority" of Swazi's disliked political parties, 
and wished not only to retain but strengthen the Monarchical system.,,150 Without these 
views being put to test through a referendum nobody can be sure that indeed the Swazi 
people do not like democracy. This would mean that the credibility and integrity of this 
consultative mechanism remains highly questionable. The consultative process was 
secretive, and driven by Princes who had special interests. Therefore the process was 
fraught with problems. What it reflects is not the wishes of the people of Swaziland as a 
whole but of those who desire to maintain the status quo. The Princes are known to have 
voiced their displeasure with the efforts of Lawyers for Human Rights in Swaziland, who 
are currently sensitising people about democracy and educating them about their rights 















heads notions that later become submissions challenging the contents of the draft 
constitution."l5l The draft constitution gives the Monarchy absolute power over the state 
and governance of Swaziland. This means that political parties will remain banned and 
democracy delayed. The Swazi's displeasure with the proposed constitutional changes has 
even gone further to the National Anthem. Some people have expressed their 
disappointment about the fact that, 
the song calls for blessings to be bestowed on Royal leadership, but makes no 
mention of the Swazi people. In Nkwene, in the southern region, Congo Shabangu 
suggested to the CDC delegation a lyric change from "God bless the leaders of 
Swaziland" to "God, who bestows blessings on the nation of Swaziland. 152 
They argued that the national anthem was discriminatory in its content because it only 
recognises the Royalty but not the people of Swaziland as a whole. 
Recently, Swazi authorities introduced legislation, which limits further freedom of 
expression. According to the International Press Institute (lPI), the global network of 
editors, media executives and leading journalists from over 115 countries, the country 
had decided to proceed with new legislation which, if enacted, would seriously impede 
the free flow of information in Swaziland and suppress the independent media. Based on 
information provided to IPI, the Justice Ministry is proposing to enact a Secrecy Act, 
which imposes a fine of US $3,385 if journalists refuse to reveal sources, it also carries 
prison sentences of up to five years, and prohibits journalists from publishing information 
the Swazi government believes to be secret l53 . 
Swaziland government commitment to authoritarian rule has been demonstrated by its 
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For instance on the 13th August 2003, Police used teargas to disperse hundreds of pro-
democracy activists and trade unionists who protested in Mbabane against Swaziland's 
hosting of the Global Smart Partnership International Dialogue. This was the first day of 
a three-day protest action by Swazi labour federations, which was broken up by the 
security forces and one unionist was reportedly killed. The national strike and 
demonstrations were called to protest the governance record of King Mswati IIL 154 In the 
eastern sugar plantation region, agricultural workers attempted to meet at the 
Tambankhulu stadium. Police fired on them with live ammunition. At least one worker 
was admitted to Good Shepard Hospital in Siteki with a Gunshot wound.!55 According to 
the Congress of SA Trade Unions, Swazi police also used live ammunition and batons to 
beat the protesters. At least 15 Presidents and former Heads of State were attending the 
three-day conference on sustainable development, including South Africa's Deputy 
President Jacob Zuma and former President Nelson Mandela. The protesters object to the 
fact that the Summit is being held in "undemocratic" Swaziland. "The Swazi police beat 
up and terrorised the protesters and also started shooting live ammunition at them.!56 
In actual fact the police action showed that they were prepared to punish anyone with 
dissenting views. The Human Rights Association of Swaziland, claimed to have collected 
dozens of statements from Swazi's who suffered indiscriminate police beatings during 
that week. The police used tear gas, rubber bullets, water cannons, batons and rifle 
against unarmed people. This police violence proved the brutality of recalcitrant 
Swaziland National Leaders who were afraid of losing their positions and privileges in 
democratic reform. The protesters argued that police beat them in order to prevent them 
from delivering their petition to the Summit, which read as follows, 
we understand that one of the basic tenets of the Global 2003 Summit is respect 
for the rule of law. Our government has jettisoned this noble tenet ... Baton-
charging and tear-gassing peaceful marchers and dispersing peaceful assembly 
shows the arrogance of force.!57 
154 Police use Teargas to Disperse Anti-Summit Protests South African Press Association 
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Despite the above protests, SADC has not publicly reacted to the situation in Swaziland. 
In fact SA DC members attended this Summit as well. The failure to operationalise the 
Organ principles on human rights and good governance has been exacerbated by lack of 
leadership within SADC member states who are overtly reluctant to exercise regional 
leadership on good governance issues. Invariably, this reluctance could be ascribed to 
member states themselves who have been facing severe criticism because of their own 
authoritarian tendencies. 
SADC has not made any effort to convince Swaziland to democratise and adopt Bill of 
human rights. The country has consistently violated human rights and it appears that 
SA DC Organ is unable to promote democracy in this country as well. The OPDSC has 
not challenged the Swazi Monarch about his undemocratic position. SADC has become 
sensitive to these issues because, some of its members are authoritarian. Venter for 
instance point out that 
Swaziland is regarded as non-democratic and is still frozen in time on the political 
dead-end road of no-party, feudal Monarchy; Zambia and Zimbabwe are accused 
of being undemocratic in election-related practices and flouting the principles of 
good governance. 158 
Clearly these undemocratic positions of SADC countries and the Organ inactiveness in 
addressing these issues reflect lack of leadership within the region, which is committed to 
ensure democracy within SADC member states. 
4.2.3 Democratic Republic of Congo 
The DRC gained independence in 1960 from Belgium. The country was renamed Zaire 
under President Mabuto and in 1970 it became a one party state under his leadership until 
1997 when rebels led by Laurent Kabila toppled the Mabuto regime. Zaire was yet again 
renamed DRC in 1997. The incessant political instability in the DRC appears to have 
damaged the prospects of democracy in this country. This has also been the case with 
Angola because of their internal instability. Democracy in this region continues to face 
158Denis Venter, "Democracy and Multiparty Politics in Africa: Recent Elections in Zambia, Zimbabwe, 











more stress, mostly In Angola, the DRC, Zimbabwe and Swaziland. In the case of 
Angola, not 
until the death of National Union for the Total Independence of Angola leader 
Jonas Savimbi in February 2002, government and opposition in Angola continued 
to interact not through parliament but through war, with hostile factions fighting 
for control of diamond and oil fields. 159 
The Organ appeared not to have convened a meeting or discussion by member states 
regarding conflict in Angola prior to the death ofthe UNIT A leader. The role of OPDSC 
had not featured in these countries, unlike in other countries whereby, it was alleged that 
instability necessitated intervention such as in Lesotho and the DRe. 
The failures of OPDSC to respond to political crises in the region derive from several 
factors; for instance one of the main reason had been that SADC and its implementing 
Organ lack not only the resources to respond to these problems, but there is also lack of 
political will within SADC member states to operationalise the Organ. While most 
members of SADC are democratic, two other members, the DRC and the Kingdom of 
Swaziland are yet to democratise. Democracy and security are strongly linked to each 
other. Democracy is therefore a conflict management strategy. 
However, as a result of peaceful negotiations chaired by Sir Ketumile Masire and South 
Africa, on the I i h July 2002, four former rebel leaders took an oath of office as Vice 
Presidents in the DRe. This does not mean that hostilities have ended there, but it was 
regarded as a step in the right direction. 
From the forgoing discussion, we can conclude that the values, which were supposed to 
have been protected by the OPDS, and later OPDC were breached by some member 
states. The interventions in the DRC and Lesotho were the cases in point as far as 
territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence were concerned. 
159 Mwesiga Baregu 'Economic and Military Security' in Christopher Landsberg and Mwesiga Baregu, 
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The major problem of lack of democratisation and therefore human rights violation by 
the above member states attested to the fact that OPOS has not been able to promote 
common values as the 1996 Protocol advocated. 
Zimbabwe had elections in 2002 and Angola had them in 1992. These countries have 
inadequate civil liberties and ORC and Swaziland still remained autocracies. 
Nevertheless, "the ORC remained least free in terms of political rights, followed by 
Swaziland and Angola (an electoral democracy without a functioning multiparty 
parliament) in the second position".160 
It can also be argued that Angola even though it had multiparty elections in 1992 is not 
different from Swaziland as a result of a bloody civil war, which escalated after 
opposition UNIT A opposed the elections outcome. 
These countries must pursue peace, development and democracy as a priority. Similarly, 
the anarchic situation in Zimbabwe necessitates major attention. It must strive to address 
law and order issues and improve civil liberties and political rights, which are deficient. 
Venter argued that the greatest deficiency within SAOC remains the absence of 
integrated systems, processes and mechanisms to deal with human rights abuses, and the 
advancement of democracy, and good govemance. 161 
While the Organ was challenged by the above problems, the following chapter will 
evaluate the OPOS limitations in details. 
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Chapter Five: The Evaluation of the Organ 
5.0 Introduction 
The SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security has been influenced by the turbulent 
relations between its member states. While most people believed that the demise of 
apartheid would remove insecurity, this has not happened. In fact just as South Africa 
was one of the countries, which caused insecurity during apartheid, it appears that, it has 
created other problems within SADC. Member states have become fearful of South 
Africa. The country has been accused of pursuing hegemonic policies and practices. 
The levels of mistrust within member states have made it difficult for the Organ to 
execute its mandate and work within a conducive environment. The unilateral 
interventions in both the DRC and Lesotho had created more tension and mistrust among 
SADC members states. This chapter will therefore address these issues, which have 
become a major obstacle to the operations of SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and 
security. 
5.1 SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security 
The OPDS primary objective is to execute the defence and security policies of SADC. 
Conversely, the word "Politics" within the Organ is not clearly defined. Until the 
meaning of this word is well understood by all members within the context of the Organ, 
SADC problems of operationalising the OPDS will still remain. The Organ principles 
relating to democracy are clear. However, the issues of politics are many and diverse. 
Therefore it is also crucial for member state to state in clear and unambiguous terms what 
the word politics means within SA DC context in order to be easily evaluated. The failure 
to define this concept within the 1996 protocol has created even more confusion between 
member states. It has been these misunderstandings, which have led to members' 
confusion of the Organ functions and mistrust between each other. 
5.2 High Levels of Mistrust 
The formation of the first Security Organ in the region appeared to have been done 
hastily without actually evaluating other options available to Member States. [t was 
assumed that apartheid South Africa was the main security issue and once that was 











inaccurate. There is high level of mistrust between these countries covering several issues 
from security, trade and operational matters of the Organ. The countries in the forefront 
of this tension have been Angola, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. 
Even though SAOC member states committed themselves to regional cooperation and 
integration, the prevailing level of mistrust led us to conclude that they are not actually 
convinced that both the SAOC and its Organ will serve their interests. The presence of 
democratic South Africa has hardened some members' attitudes. They saw South Africa 
as pursuing hegemonic agenda within the region, hence the reason why some members 
supported Zimbabwe over its intervention in ORC. Member states as a result have 
become fearful of losing their sovereignty and independence as a result of the 
establishment of the Organ. While member states perceived the creation of OPOS as an 
institution of conflict management and security, they also see it as a precursor for 
intervention in their own countries. They share the opinion that this Organ might be used 
against them and interfere in their domestic and foreign policies. As such member states 
have become suspicious about this Organ. 
One of the most contentious aspects for OPOS has been its principles. Zimbabwe and its 
allies believed that rather than an Organ having clear principles it is desirable for it to 
operate on an ad hoc manner. Their view is that the Organ will be more flexible in this 
way. Therefore, they are opposed to an Organ protocol that contains clear procedures of 
conduct and principles of values in managing conflicts. This means that if the Organ 
operates according to these principles and procedures, decisions must be arrived at 
through consensus. As already explained in chapter three, consensus is difficult to reach 
within SAOC. This will inevitably lead to a situation whereby consensus would not be 
reached. The confusion and misinterpretation of the Organ functions by Zimbabwe and 
its allies is a case in point. 
The mistrust is so entrenched within SAOC that Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia signed 
their own defence pact outside OPOS. This also reflects the fact that within SAOC, there 












The disagreement between Zimbabwe, the then chair of the OPDS, and South Africa, the 
chair of SADC, over the functions of OPDS spilled over to the public domain thus 
creating an impasse which was referred back to the member states to address. 
The Organ impasse in the security area between South Africa and Zimbabwe was passed 
over to Mozambique, Namibia and Malawi in 1997. These countries were mandated to 
address this impasse. However, "the report is still outstanding. In other words, when new 
crisis in the DRC and Lesotho erupted in 1998, there was no Organ to deal with 
them.,,162This task was subsequently passed to the newly elected SADC chairperson, 
Mozambique, from SA in 1999 Summit. Similarly the results were still negative in regard 
to resuscitation of the Organ. 
The task of conflict management within SADC has had international resonance. The 
United States, during the 1990's Great Lakes crisis, suggested the establishment of an 
All-African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI).163 This international initiative was to be 
composed of major SADC countries such as Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
This US initiative immediately resurrected suspicions about the role of OPDS. Most 
countries were suspicious about Botswana's special relations with the US. It has been 
some of these issues that divided these countries. It would appear that the Great Lakes 
crisis has complicated SADC in dealing with conflicts within the region. As hostilities 
increased in the DRC, both SADC and the UN convened an urgent Summit whereby they 
called for a ceasefire and peace. In July 1999, the parties ceased hostilities and signed the 
peace agreement. What was most salient about this ceasefire was that it "did not originate 
from any SADC initiative, as there were combination of bilateral efforts driven mainly by 
Zambia and South Africa.,,164 As far as the OPDS was consent, it remained suspended 
and its position far from clarified. President Chissano was now tasked to resolve the 
differences of opinion over the autonomy of the Organ. By the time the August 1999 
Maputo Summit came to an end, the Organ position remained unknown. 
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In the case of Lesotho, both South Africa and Botswana argued that their intervention 
was the response to appeals from a legitimate government, which required them to assist 
in suppressing the ensuing political instability in that country. In relation to Lesotho crisis 
therefore, 
both South Africa and Botswana claimed that they were acting on SADC 
mandates, but at the time the Organ was suspended and neither SADC nor ISDSC 
or the Defence Committee had met explicitly to mandate such action. 165 
While it was clear that the intervention was outside the SADC and of course the Organ 
mandate, the lesson to be learnt here relate to how such events could be avoided in future. 
The Organ could not feature because member states were still debating its future 
functions. What complicates matters even more was the fact that the 1996 treaty does not 
provide for unilateral troops deployment without prior blessings by both the African 
Union and the UN Security Council. 
From the above discussion, it is clear that the cases of Lesotho and the DRC were the 
manifestation of the Organ failure in preventative diplomacy. The most significant 
shortcoming relates to lack of transparency. It was not clear how the decision to intervene 
in the DRC and Lesotho was taken, nor was it clear who authorised the mission. We do 
not know who took the decision to intervene between SADC and the Organ, or indeed, if 
there was any deliberation. It is also unclear which SADC Summit authorised these 
interventions. The issue of mistrust harbours serious implications for 1996 OPDS 
protocol. It is impossible to have similar defence and foreign policy under these 
circumstances. 
5.3 Interventions 
The interventions in DRC and Lesotho exacerbated suspicions and divisions between 
member states. While answers remained unavailable, speculation is rife that South Africa 
intervened in Lesotho on the basis of its realist perspective. It intervened to protect its 
main interest the water project in Lesotho. The peacekeeping mission led by South Africa 
and Botswana was to protect these interests under the guise of SADC auspices. It has 











been difficult to ascertain and justify the authenticity of this intervention under SAOC or 
the Organ. Similarly, in the case of ORC it would appear that Zimbabwe and its allies had 
similar economic interests, which can be related to the control of the ORC vast diamonds 
resources. This conclusion derived from the fact that both interventions were not 
informed by both SAOC treaty and the 1996 Organ protocol. In fact in both these cases 
neither the Organisation of African Union (OAU) nor the United Nations were informed 
about these operations. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter stated clearly that regional 
Organs such as SAOC or OPOS should conduct no enforcement action without prior 
approval by the UN Security Council. The lack of clear authorisation of intervention 
pol icy in both conflicts questions the legitimacy of these interventions. 
Lack of transparency surrounding these interventions, raised even more complications for 
the countries concerned. This was despite the fact that all UN decisions authorising 
peacekeeping missions or even enforcement mission are transparent and taken on the 
public domain. The ORC and Lesotho cases lack these credible ingredients, which justify 
the legitimacy of both interventions. 
These actions reflect the urgent need for an early warning system within SAOC that 
could be put in place before fire breaks out. It is not desirable to award a Nobel peace 
price to someone who excels in extinguishing fire, rather than to the person who prevents 
it. The OPOS must institutionalise this early warning mechanism. 166 
5.4 Lack of Common Defence Policy 
Lack of a common defence policy within the community had weakened the OPOS. 
Member states have adopted a narrow and a traditional view of security. This view means 
that "security was seen in zero-sum terms: the security of one meant the insecurity of the 
other, a view that deepened even further as the conflict gained a regional character.,,167 
Therefore, security according to this view is very important and sensitive to be 
subordinated to bureaucratic debates on economic development within SAOC. As such 
166 Ibbo Mandaza "Comment, SADC and Preventive Diplomacy", in Southern African Political 
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some member states have instead elected to operate on an ad hoc basis thus bypassing 
formal SADC structures. Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia decided to intervene in the 
DRC without the SADC mandate. They were soon replicated by South Africa and 
Botswana who intervened in Lesotho acting outside formal SADC mechanism. 
5.5 Lack of Democracy within the Region 
One of the serious limitations that SADC faces is lack of well functioning democracy 
within the region. The Organ was intended to assist in the promotion of democracy 
within SADe. Unfortunately this goal proved to be too ambitious and idealistic to come 
to fruition. Zimbabwe and Swaziland are still undemocratic. Both countries continued to 
violate human rights without even SA DC as a whole taking a united stand against them. 
For the DRC and Angola, internal problems have limited any rapid prospects for 
democratisation due to the prevailing civil wars in these countries. 
The above discussion indicated that realism is very much alive in Southern African. 
SADC members still put their security interests first when deciding on any policy option. 
The OPDS failures stem from the fact that members are still calculative when it comes to 
making decision relating to security issues. It would appear that member states are still 
very protective about their sovereignty and thus they still subscribe very much to realism. 
Their interests are primary in almost all of their actions. In shaping decisions in 
interventions in the DRC and Lesotho and in trade policies and even in sectoral policies 
of SADC, member states interests are paramount. The issue of lack of trust also 
highlights this realist perspective. 
The issue of security in most countries is still a very sensitive area. The fact that the 
Organ on Politics Defence and Security could not function as expected stems from fears 
of member states. Concerned with their sovereignty, they would not allow the Organ to 
deal with their security issues, which they regarded as sensitive. The Zimbabwean 
argument about OPDS functions reflected some of these fears. This country demonstrated 
this fear explicitly when it signed security pact with Angola and Namibia without even 
informing the Summit while it was still a chair of the SADC Organ. 
This traditional security thinking has militated against new security thinking in other 











under these circumstances. Inevitably, these countries could not be able to assist OPDS in 
the implementation of both its principles and objectives. 
It is also important to note that OPDS had not been able to promote democratisation as 
required by the Organ Protocol. The prevailing mistrust between member states made it 
hard for the Organ to perform its functions as mandated by the Protocol since its 
inception in June 1996. Therefore, SADC needs to seriously revisit its operations as far as 
the Organ is concerned. It must also try to build confidence between member states in 
order to be able to come up with a credible unified common defence policy suitable for 
the region as a whole. 
While these limitations may stem from the Organ relations with the rest of SADC, the 











Chapter Six: :Future Prospects 
6.0 Introduction 
l he above discussion indicated that, there were a plethora of issues, whIch remains to be 
clarified and addressed by SAOC before it ventures into the future. For this regIOnal 
organisation to be efficient and effective it must live up to its regional expectations and 
promises. This chapter will therefore address this unfinished business. 
6.1 The Challenges of OPDSC 
Like any new organisation, SAOC Organ had experienced challenges, which must be 
overcome if the organisation is to be effective. Currently some of these challenges have 
been defmed in terms of tensions and suspicions between member slates. The other 
problem has been the member's willingness to confront these challenges, which have 
bedevilled the progress within the organisation. Political will and commitment by SAOe 
member states is also critical for the Organ to achieve its objectives and principles, as an 
institution which has been created to manage conflicts within the region. 
The tension that emerged between Zimbabwe and South Africa can be traced back to the 
formation of SAOC itself. One of the main reasons why SAOC was established was to 
confront the apartheid regime. This legacy has corne back in the post-apartheid area to 
haunt SADe. There is currently a high level of mistrust and tension between South 
Africa, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Zambia and Botswana. This has created much 
stress within the region. This polarity carne to the fore as a result of Zimbabwe and its 
allies intervention in the ORe. These were followed by SA refusal to joint the parties in 
this endeavour and instead denouncing the trio for intervening without the Summit 
sanctioning their actions. 
These countries did not form closer relations with SA, but viewed SA as aspiring to 
hegemonic policies. The war in ORC revived old tensions between SA and Zimbabwe 
together with its allies as known from the apartheid era. This resulted in Zimbabwe 
Angola and Namibia collaborating against SA during its tenure as a chair of SADC and 
intervened in ORC without informing it. 
Another challenge that SAOC must address has been the members' lack of political will 











declared their commitment to regional co-operation and integration, the reality is 
different. These countries are not fully convinced that this regional body best serves their 
national interests. This assertion is confirmed by the actions of Zimbabwe and its allies, 
who have interpreted some SAOC paragraphs to serve their own interests. The 
interpretation and the operationalisation of the Organ have created tension that was not 
anticipated. Baregu 168 argued that, paragraph 4.3.1 of the 1996 Summit stated that the 
Organ shall operate independently from other SAOC structures and operate at the 
Summit level and also at the ministerial and technical levels. On the other hand, 
subparagraph 4.3.3 stated that ISOSC should be one ofthe institutions of the Organ. This 
institution was empowered to establish other structures as the need arise. 
The members' interpretation of 
these two subparagraphs of the Summit communique' have been the major bone 
of contention between SAOC members with respect to their interpretation of the 
operationalisation of the Organ. The 1997 Summit in Blantyre, Malawi, failed to 
resolve these outstanding differences. 169 
Therefore, the action that was taken by Zimbabwe and its allies has exacerbated the 
tension and debates over the ORC crisis within SAOC. South Africa on other hand, 
argued that the decision to intervene rest squarely with the Summit because it was a 
legitimate policy making body of the Organ. Article 10 of the 1996 SAOC Treaty 
supports this position by stating that SAOC is "the supreme policy making institution, the 
Organ is answerable to the Summit".170 Conversely, Zimbabwe and its partners have 
taken a position that the Botswana Summit has created a separate Summit for OPOS 
which operations are based on the principles of FLS. These tensions reflect a clear lack of 
consensus among parties and also hegemonic struggles within the region more especially 
between South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
The problem of consensus within SAOC sterns from the functions of OPOS. Both the 
OPOS and SAOC give an impression that the two Organs are not related. The 
Chairperson of SAOC is elected for three years while that of OPOS is supposed to rotate 
168 Mwesiga 8aregu 'Economic and Military Security' in Christopher Landsberg and Mwesiga 8aregu, 
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annually. The problem has been that, "no institutional mechanism was established to 
harmonise or co-ordinate the work between the OPDS and the SADC".171 
Suspicions are rife between member states within SADC. Some SADC states fear loss of 
sovereignty and independence as a result of the establishment of a regional body that 
oversees the functions of conflict management, security and defence. They are concerned 
that OPDS might at some stage be used to interfere in their domestic affairs and foreign 
policy. This explains why some member states "have signed a protocol guaranteeing free 
circulation of SADC nationals in the region, but the ratification of this protocol and 
implementation by national governments is still pending". 172 
The other challenge facing the Organ is the creation of a solid and firm early warning 
system mechanism in the area of security and good governance. The current structure, 
which is based in Zimbabwe, is yet to be developed. It has become difficult for SADC 
and indeed the OPDS to know when crisis are about to emerge and where. In fact the 
Organ needs to be restructured in order to operate efficiently and effectively. 
A few SADC states believe that South Africa seeks to pursue a hegemonic agenda 
through the Organ. These countries have watched SA negotiating and signing trade 
agreements with European Union, which exclude SADC members. These countries felt 
that SA seeks to advance its strategic interest but not that of the region as a whole. 
Similarly, suspicions still exist between SA and Zimbabwe on economic and military 
issues. This suspicion extends to Angola and Zambia. Angola accused these countries of 
harbouring dangerous UNIT A elements. 173Namibia on the other hand still perceives SA 
as having neo-colonial ambitions. It has been these suspicions, which have precluded the 
possibility of arriving at the consensus of grafting a common security policy and a unified 
vision of the region. 
The intervention by Zimbabwe and its allies in the DRC reflected that some SADC states 
are convinced that intra-and-inter-state conflicts are best addressed in a flexible and ad-
hoc fashion. 
171 Agostinho Zacarias" Redefining Security", in Christopher Landsberg and Mwesiga Baregu, From Cape 
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They are therefore opposed to an Organ protocol that contains clear principles and 
procedures for conflict prevention and resolution. This also reflects lack of common 
understanding of OPDS objectives and principles on the basis of which security can be 
viewed in the region, more especially the sixth objective, which states that intervention 
will be used as a last resort and also under the UN and AU principles. Some states are 
also concerned that a conflict management system that requires decision-making by 
consensus will inevitably be unable to reach consensus in situations of crisis. Therefore, 
member states appear to be more comfortable in operating informally on an ad hoc basis 
whereby their police forces have been co-operating in different operations outside the 
legal framework of the OPDS. 
Some states (e.g. Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola) are more interested in a collective 
defence pact than in common security arrangements. This led to these countries signing 
their own Defence Treaty in April 1999 without the official notification to the SADC 
Chairperson or Summit. This Treaty of the trio stated that any armed attack on one is an 
attack on all ofthem. 174 
There is a fundamental divide between the SADC states that have an antimilitarist 
approach to conflict management and those who have a militarist orientation that relies 
on the use and threat of military force. It is clear that Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe 
support a military rather than a diplomatic approach to conflict management. This 
obviously, has had a critical bearing on the OPDS protocol. Another relevant feature is 
the fundamental divide between SADC states that are democratic and those that are not. 
The Organ protocol requires the promotion and development of democratic institutions 
and practices within SADC. The challenge has been to attain democratic institutions and 
practices in non-democratic states such as the Kingdom of Swaziland, the DRC and to a 
certain extent Angola and Zimbabwe. 
Many of the SA DC states that have embraced multiparty democracy nonetheless lack 
common democratic values. The region only began to experience pluralistic politics in 
the early eighties. Despite this new democratic development, democratic culture is far 
174 Nathan, Laurie (2002) "Organ Failure": A Review of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and 
Security: In Regional Integration for Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in Africa; ed. Laakso Liisa 
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from noticeable. The protracted conflict in Angola after Jonas Savimbi lost elections, the 
recalcitrant attitude of the Swaziland Monarch to issues of democracy and the elections 
disputes in Zimbabwe are cases in point. These are some of the challenges that SAOC 
must address in order to live up to its regional objectives. 
The 1996 SAOC protocol is silent on the role of civil society. This sector can playa 
pivotal role in informing policies and assisting both the OPOSC and SAOC operations. If 
SADC is to become a democratic institution, it must shed this traditional security posture 
of state centric view and allow this sector to have a role. Civil society can assist the 
OPOSC to be more proactive rather than reactive as it has become the norm. In fact the 
Organ appears to lack proactive mechanism even when con flicts have emerged, there is 
lack of concerted strategy to address these challenges. 
6.2 Prospects for future 
SAOC appears reluctant to change from traditional to the new security thinking. This 
analysis stems from the position that the Organ appeared to have embraced new security 
thinking while institutional structures have not yet developed for providing efficient and 
effective implementation. [n fact mechanisms for securing peace in the region are still 
undeveloped. Conversely, the Organ is still new and SAOC in its current form need to be 
developed further. This will take time and resources. It is important for SAOC to adopt 
the new security thinking because it will be able to put more emphasis on developmental 
issues, which would consolidate their political integration further. These include issues 
such as poverty reduction, HIV/AIDS, cross border crime, drug trafficking and a single 
defence policy. All these factors have security dimension. It was traditional security 
thinking which inhibited SAOC progress. Therefore, the adoption of the new thinking can 
contribute to a dynamic and more prosperous future for the region. 
Both SAOC and the Organ can operate efficiently and effectively only if there is political 
will to do so. Currently, member states appear to be working towards this endeavour. 













This reflects political maturity on the part of SAOC. The fact that South Africa and 
Zambia with the UN were able to bring Zimbabwe with its allies to the table and signed a 
peace agreement that led to cessation of hostilities in the ORC signifies this maturity. 
6.2.1 Policies on Early Warning Systems within Member States 
The importance of establishing early warning systems cannot be overemphasised. SAOC 
cannot leave this to chance and operate on an ad hoc basis. The region in order to arrest 
timeously, conflicts such as those in Lesotho, Zimbabwe and the ORC, must establish 
early warning mechanisms to manage these conflicts before they develop into unpalatable 
violence. Several cases can be cited to justify why it is crucial for SAOC to have such a 
system and how the system will benefit the region in managing its conflicts. 
Ahmed175 argued that less than a decade after the end of the cold war, 101armed conflicts 
have been recorded which brought death and destruction's to nearly 68 countries. What 
was even more alarming was that in most of these conflicts, military factors severely 
hampered relief efforts. Furthermore, 800,000 people were massacred in Rwanda in 1994 
genocide during April and July. This was described as "one of the most abhorrent events 
of the twentieth century".176 As if the world had not seen enough of this calamity, less 
than a year later in one of the worst war crimes committed in Europe since the end of 
Second World War, the Bosnian Muslims town of Srebrenica fell to a siege by Serb 
militias, during which 8,000 Muslims were killed under the eyes of the UN peacekeeping 
contingent deployed when Srebrenica had become the world's first ever-civilian safe area 
in 1993.177 
It became very clear at the time that the world was in need of early warning systems. 
This will make it easier to predict these conflicts. Therefore, it is essential for states to 
develop effective early warning capacity to assess these risks. 
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Ahmed l78 argued that if crises could be prevented, lives and scarce resources would be 
saved. Early warnings inform decision~makers about signs of any simmering conflict that 
might lead to the country experiencing armed conflict. Early warning involves two main 
tasks; firstly, it identifies the type of conflict and its location. This enables the researchers 
to establish whether the conflict could be violent or not. The second role of early warning 
is the monitoring and appraising of the situation in order to calculate the probability of 
violence. Early warning has also been defined as the ability to collect and analyse data in 
the interest of providing strategic choices for preventive action if necessary. 179 
In order to assist states in the monitoring and assessment of conflict, The General 
Assembly passed Resolution 46/182, which was adopted in 1991. This was put forward 
as a guiding principle for the co-ordination and provision of humanitarian assistance. It 
was geared toward preparedness and prevention of armed conflict. The purpose of HEWS 
was to identify crisis with humanitarian implications. Therefore, early warning is 
the systematic collection and analysis of information coming from areas of crisis for the 
purposes of anticipating the escalation of violent conflict, development of strategic 
responses to these crisis and presenting of options to critical actors for the purposes of 
decision-makers. 180 
These initiatives have long been used to prevent various natural calamities such as 
volcanoes, snow, earthquakes and floods. The major goal is to warn people and various 
organs and agencies responsible for assisting victims and formulate contingency plans in 
order to prevent the situation from creating maximum damage and injury to both human 
and property. 
In conflict management "Early warning is about forecasting the potential for a crisis: 
namely the escalation or eruption of inter-state conflicts. The aim is to avert violence".181 
Though other early warning strategies can monitor and measure specific variables, 
conflict early warning system need information from various sources as wide ranging as 
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economy, history of conflict, social factors, communal hostilities and political factors. A 
thorough and effective, credible analysis is required to assess the risk factors. 
Nevertheless, even if the information is objectively analysed and is free of biases, as long 
as those who are in authority are not taking requisite steps conflict prevention will fail. 
This demands a high commitment from both local and international players to ensure that 
conflict is managed and does not escalate. 
An early warning initiative was perceived as a tool used to describe different and 
differing activities. Others argued that the "Humanitarian Early Warning System 
(HEWS) was established to identify crises with humanitarian implications, recognising 
that the causes of crisis are as numerous and as complex as the implications 
themselves".182 HEWS emphasise the importance of collecting and building and 
sustaining computer-assisted information gathering network. This was to enable the 
system to manage large volumes of information. ls3 Organising voluminous information 
of data was the objective of HEWS. It was envisaged that the effective management of 
information would assist in the analysis, identification of data that will generate credible 
and accurate early warning information. Some of the sources of HEWS were UN 
agencies, Bretton Woods Institutions, members states, NGOs, and academia. Ahmed 
argued that this approach was to analyse background conditions, which focus on low and 
worsening human development indicators, economic decline, and high level of disparities 
among demographic groupS.184 
In addition to the above, the approach focuses on accelerating factors. These relate to 
monitoring of those factors that may escalate the tension. These are lawlessness, 
deterioration of food security, arms inflows, and discrimination and targeting. Finally, the 
approach looks at the trigger incidents such as changes in leadership and other external 
actions and changes within the region. Togo is the case in point where there is a serious 
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decline of law and order, deteriorating security situation whereby the anny has not been 
paid for months and they are currently engaged in sporadic looting. Some tribes are being 
targeted as in Ivory Coast before and after the attempted coup last year. 
According to Davies,185 the main goal of early warning is proactive engagement in the 
earlier stages of potential conflicts or crisis. It is geared towards prevention and 
alleviation of potentially destructive conflict. Tracking down and identifying the 
background conditions that constitute the root causes of tension can expose structural 
tensions. These conditions may lead to unnecessary tension, which may escalate crisis. 
Dynamic factors of acceleration may be identified; otherwise they may exacerbate the 
conflict into a major crisis. 
In-country situation studies by specialised observers can be carried out including 
screening and analytical coding of public news sources. Davies 186 argues further that, the 
quality of available infonnation sources, the reliability of early warning of various crisis 
phenomena also depend on the understanding and analysis of their root causes. These 
methods can be used as a reservoir of infonnation about early warnings. Further more, 
systematised sharing of field reports and analysis from different agencies within the 
country can be another source of early warning initiatives. The coded assessment by 
country experts of current situations and trends, country or group-profiles, or databases of 
structural indicators that provide the basis for long-tenn risk assessments can provide 
viable data for early warnings. 
Ted Gurr l87 identified three factors, which have a high propensity for a minority group to 
rebel. These are, 
collective incentives, capacity for joint action, and external opportunities. Each 
concept is represented by indicators constructed from data coded for the project, 
and justified by correlations with the magnitude of ethnic rebellions in previous 
years. ISS 
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Gurr argued that the Kosovo Albanians at the time of their appraising in the I 990s had 
high incentives to rebel but lacked capacity and opportunity. Nevertheless, the East 
Timorese had both incentive and capacity to rebel. This approach yields acceptable 
results that may direct the focus to agencies, which may devise the appropriate conflict 
management strategy 1 89. This could be used as an effective policy tool in decision-
making. 190 
In sharing this information, transparency and accountability are crucial in identifying the 
source. Collaborating in collecting, analysing and sharing information is key to the 
development of an effective early warning system. 191 Most NGOs in the 1980s supported 
the documentation of networks based on mutually agreed standards formats for the 
compilation and dissemination of data provided by human rights monitors. 192 
The early warning initiatives have therefore been triumphant in several cases. Imminent 
armed conflict crises were prevented in the 1990s. In Macedonia and Ukraine (1992), 
Guatemala (1993), Fiji (1996) and other places. 193 These successes were as a result of 
cost effective prevention interventions that were alerted by early warning initiatives. 194 
The measurement for successful early warning initiatives is based on analysis, which is 
directly linked to strategic options for political and preventive action. For instance Rusu, 
argued that this system was triumphant in the following areas of conflict: 
Macedonia, as a result of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 
mission, and the UN peacekeeping presence. Burundi and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, owing, inter alia, to the respective efforts of international crisis group whose 
reporting has kept Burundi high on regional and international agendas; and The African 
Peace Forum, whose network of members warned of the potential for resumed fighting in 
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Eastern Congo in mid-1998. 195 These conflicts did not explode because of successful 
early warning initiatives that were carried out by the above groups. 
Given contemporary developments in technological advancement, such as the Internet 
and telephone communication, there is high potential for information to be made 
available with meagre resources in order to provide early warning triggers. An integrated 
approach to the prevention of conflict involves all levels of groups within society, 
regional and international. It also requires decentralisation of decision-making among all 
stakeholders and the recognition of their unique role in conflict prevention. 
While more information is now available, the major challenge is to engage governments 
for more effective action. This can be done through provision of reliable early warning 
information, which has been analysed, and communicated in a reliable manner to the 
authorities. This information should primarily be based on open sources and be easily 
availed to the public. It can assist decision-makers to take collaborative action. The 
accuracy and credibility of this information is critical. There is a need to develop 
common information policies within the whole region in order to achieve this task. 
Communication among communities has improved tremendously. 
Local, regional and international structures have become more integrated and their 
capacities developed. 
It is essential for SADC to assist in strengthening member states institutions and their 
commitment in building early warning, risks assessment and rapid diplomatic 
deployment mechanism, which would be crucial for addressing violent conflicts within 
the region. 
6.2.2 The Role of Civil Society 
The role of Civil Society in conflict management cannot be overemphasised and SADC 
has the opportunity to incorporate this sector in its structures. To allow this sector to 
participate within the regional body will go far in promoting SADC credibility as a 
democratic institution. Civil Society is known to excel in building grassroots centred 
approaches to conflict management. This approach will enable SADC to have an impact 
195 Sharon Rusu,. 2001 "Principles and practice of Conflict Early Warning:" In Journal of Conflict, Security 











at the grass roots level more especially in the area of conflict management and resolution. 
When communities are at peace with one another, OPDSC can be able to focus on other 
security areas that will aid the development of the region. 
The new security thinking includes among others poverty as a security threat, which 
means that OPDSC must deal with this new threat. The participation of Civil Society 
within the SADC structures will inform policies geared towards poverty alleviation and 
devising local solutions to conflicts that may be motivated by poverty at the local level. 
Since Civil Society works at the local levels, its participation is crucial in informing 
policies, which are able to address local conflicts, and provide grassroots solutions to 
these local conflicts. Therefore, SADC has the opportunity to open its doors for this 
sector to be involved so that incessant conflicts can be addressed before they explode into 
major conflicts. In fact the role of Civil Society in this area also serves as an early 
warning mechanism, which SADC definitely needs. 
6.2.3 Preventive Diplomacy 
SADC needs to develop a coherent and unified proactive diplomatic strategy. This 
strategy might require direct negotiations and interventionism where necessary. Proactive 
or preventative diplomacy will reduce conflicts and associated humanitarian costs that 
usualIy follow the devastating carnage and atrocities of intra-state and inter-state 
conflicts. 
This strategy will aid the implementation of 1996 protocol, more especially the Organ 
objectives which were geared towards conflict management and resolution through 
peaceful means. SADC must also practice open diplomacy rather than secret or silent 
diplomacy. White argued that open diplomacy, which was subject to public scrutiny and 
control, was very important because "states were no longer the only actors involved".196 
SADC must therefore involve more of these groups both domestic and international, 
which deal with or are engaged in diplomacy. 
196 Brian White, "Diplomacy" in The Globalisation of World Politics: an Introduction to International 











SADC must therefore, prepare itself to use various forms of multilateral and bilateral 
diplomacy in stabilising the region. This can be done by constantly conducting civic 
education about the role of SADC and its Organs. Conferences can be held to sensitise 
people in these matters. This would go far in enhancing OPDS principles and objectives 
that have been adopted by OPDSC in august 200 I Summit and thus sustaining SADC as 
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